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TRANSACTION ACCOUNT FEES:
DO THE POOR REALLY PAY MORE THAN THE
RICH?
Julie Andersen Hill*
During the Great Recession and its aftermath, customers became
increasingly concerned about the fees banks charge for checking
(transaction) accounts. Some believe that banks’ fee structures are unfair.
In particular, commentators often assert that high overdraft and other fees
paid by poor consumers cross-subsidize free accounts for rich consumers
or businesses. If true, this regressive cross-subsidization could be forcing
some consumers to do without banking services or to use more costly fringe
financial service providers. Moreover, if regressive cross-subsidization
exists, it would provide a powerful argument for increased regulation of
account fees.
Despite frequent claims that poor accountholders cross-subsidize rich
accountholders, there is little scholarship examining or establishing such
claims. This Article examines both theoretical and empirical evidence of
cross-subsidization among transaction accountholders. Contrary to the
assumptions made in much of the account fee literature, this Article
concludes there is little evidence that the poor cross-subsidize the rich.
What the Article does find, however, is contradictory account fee
regulation.
Some regulations encourage fee structures with high
overdrafts while other regulations simultaneously discourage overdraft
fees. This Article recommends that instead of focusing on crosssubsidization, policymakers should work to establish a coherent theory of
transaction account fee regulation. A coherent theory of fee regulation
could correct this inconsistency and provide clear direction for banks.

* Associate Professor, University of Alabama School of Law. I am grateful to Aaron Bruhl,
Darren Bush, Bryan Fair, Chad Pomeroy, Christopher Sagers, and Michael Hill for their
helpful comments on this Article. I am also indebted to the faculties of Case Western
Reserve University School of Law, the University of Arkansas School of Law, and the
University of Alabama School of Law, who kindly allowed me to present the Article at
faculty workshops.
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INTRODUCTION
In our modern economy, consumers rely on a variety of payment
systems. They pay by cash, checks, credit cards, debit cards, prepaid cards,
automated clearing house (ACH) transfers, and internet accounts. While
there are numerous payment choices, many of the choices require a
common ingredient—a transaction account. A transaction account, often
called a checking account, is a bank account used to make payments to
third parties.1 Consumers withdraw money from their transaction accounts
by writing checks, using debit cards, using automated teller machine
(ATM) cards, or authorizing electronic withdrawals of money (such as
providing an account number and bank routing number to a merchant or
using a bank’s online bill pay service). Survey data indicate that 91.8% of
consumers in the United States have at least one transaction account.2
Banks charge transaction accountholders a variety of fees. While
transaction accounts’ fee structures differ from bank to bank (and even
account to account), common fees include overdraft fees,3 insufficient
funds fees,4 return item fees,5 stop payment fees,6 and account maintenance
fees.7 Some banks also assess teller fees,8 smart-phone banking fees,9
1. 12 U.S.C. § 461(b)(1)(C) (Supp. 2011); 12 C.F.R. § 204.2(e) (2012).
2. Kevin Foster et al., 2009 Survey of Consumer Payment Choice, FED. RESERVE BANK
OF BOSTON PUB. POL’Y DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 11-1, at 47 (Apr. 2011), available at
http://www.bostonfed.org/economic/ppdp/2011/ppdp1101.pdf.
3. A bank assesses an overdraft fee when it pays an item even though the customer’s
account does not have sufficient funds to cover the transaction.
U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-281, BANK FEES: FEDERAL BANKING REGULATORS
COULD BETTER ENSURE THAT CONSUMERS HAVE REQUIRED DISCLOSURE DOCUMENTS PRIOR
TO
OPENING
CHECKING
OR
SAVINGS
ACCOUNTS
1
(2008),
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08281.pdf [hereinafter GAO, BANK FEES REPORT].
4. A bank assesses an insufficient funds fee when it returns an item that would have
overdrawn the customer’s account. Id. at 4–5.
5. A bank assesses a return item fee when a customer deposits an item that is later
returned unpaid. Id. at 12.
6. A bank assesses a stop payment fee for processing a customer’s order to stop
payment on a previously written check. Id.
7. Banks typically assess maintenance fees “on a monthly basis for maintaining a
checking . . . account. Depository institutions frequently waive routine service fees for
customers who maintain a monthly minimum balance or meet other requirements, such as
for direct deposits of paychecks.” Id.
8. See Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Attack of the New Bank Fees, WALL ST. J., Jan. 14,
2012, at B8 (“PNC . . . hits customers with a $3 fee when they use a teller to transfer money.
Bank of America already charges online customers for making deposits or withdrawals
through a teller.”).
9. Id. (“U.S. Bancorp already hits customers with a 99-cent fee to make a mobile
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paper statement fees,10 and a variety of other fees.
In recent years, banks have increased transaction account fees. A
Government Accountability Office study found that between 2000 and
2007, banks’ fees for insufficient funds, overdrafts, returns of deposited
items, and stop payment orders all increased.11 Fee increases continued as
the country entered the Great Recession.12 The typical overdraft fee
increased by a dollar between 2007 and 2008.13 Monthly account
maintenance charges increased even more.14 At the same time, the weak
economy made it harder for some consumers to avoid overdraft and
insufficient funds fees or maintain a balance high enough to avoid
maintenance charges. A 2009 study by the Center for Responsible
Lending, a consumer advocacy group, estimated that bank fees collected
for overdrafts had increased 35% between 2006 and 2008.15 Today the

deposit. To see pending transactions on their phones, customers at Mercantile Bank of
Michigan have to pay $4 a month.”).
10. See Candice Choi, A Richer 2012: A Monthly Guide to Maximizing Money,
HOUSTON CHRON., Dec. 26, 2011, at B6 (“The monthly service fee for a basic checking
account at U.S. Bank, for example, is $6.95 when customers opt for e-statements. If
customers opt for paper statements, however, their monthly fee is $8.95.”).
11. GAO, BANK FEES REPORT, supra note 3, at 68. Using different data that was not
representative of the banking industry generally, the GAO concluded that account
maintenance fees may have decreased during the same time period. Id. at 67, 69. At any
rate, the study concluded that the percentage of bank income collected from fees rose from
2000 to 2006. Id. at 17–20. Others also noted an increase in bank fees during this time
period. See, e.g., Thomas Watterson, Beware of Soaring Bank Fees, THE CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Nov. 17, 2008, at 15 (noting in 2008 that bank fees had been increasing for the
last ten years).
12. “Great Recession” refers to the economic recession that “began in December 2007
and probably ended in June or July 2009.” David Wessel, A Big, Bad . . . ‘Great’
Recession?, WALL ST. J., Apr. 8, 2010, at A2. Bank fee increases during recessions were
previously uncommon. Eric Dash, How High Can They Go?: Banks Quietly Raise Fees in
Penny-Pinching Times, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2009, at B1 (reporting data collected by bank
account fee researcher Michael Moebs).
13. See Dash, supra note 12, at B8 (noting that the typical overdraft charge increased
from $25 to $26 and that it had been at only $22 a few years earlier).
14. See id. (noting that in June 2009, Bank of America “raised the fees on its basic
monthly checking account to $8.95 from $5.95”); Obama’s A-Team; The Money Pit;
Bailout Free-for-all; Read My Lips; Groups Claim Rise in Hate Crimes, LOU DOBBS
TONIGHT (CNN television broadcast Nov. 24, 2008), available at 2008 WLNR 22470689
(“ATM surcharges, bounced bank check fees and monthly service fees all jump[ed] in one
year, from September 2007 to September [2008]. . . . Monthly service fees and interest
bearing accounts [in 2008] averag[ed] almost $12 and the minimum account balance needed
to avoid those fees [rose] to close to $3,500, four percent higher than [in 2007].”).
15. LESLIE PARRISH, OVERDRAFT EXPLOSION: BANK FEES FOR OVERDRAFTS INCREASE
35% IN TWO YEARS, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING (Oct. 6, 2009), available at
http://www.responsiblelending.org/overdraft-loans/research-analysis/crl-overdraftexplosion.pdf.
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median overdraft fee is $30,16 and some experts predict rising transaction
account fees in the future.17
Transaction account customers have not overlooked banks’ fee
increases. When Bank of America announced a monthly $5 fee for
customers who use a debit card to make purchases, customer Kristen
Christian posted her complaints about the fee on Facebook and urged her
friends to transfer their accounts elsewhere.18 Ms. Christian’s complaint
drew a nationwide following that eventually resulted in Bank of America’s
decision to rescind the fee.19 Despite this apparent victory for consumers,
many believe that Bank of America and other large banks will simply
increase other account fees.20
While critics of current transaction account fees raise a variety of
complaints, one of the most common complaints is that banks’ pricing
structures are unfair to the poor. One of Ms. Christian’s objections to Bank
of America’s fee was that the bank would waive the fee for customers who
maintained a balance of at least $20,000.21 Ms. Christian concluded that
the “fee clearly target[ed] the impoverished [and] working class.”22

16. Press Release, Moebs $ervices, Overdraft Fee Revenue Falls as Banks Raise
Overdraft Prices (Jan. 18, 2012), available at http://www.moebs.com/Portals/0/pdf/Press
%20Releases/120111%20Moebs%20PR%20OD%20Revenue%20%20Price%20Final%20118-12%20(2).pdf.
17. See Silver-Greenberg, supra note 8, at B8 (predicting that banks will increase fees
to offset the costs associated with greater regulation); Elizabeth Reed Smith, The US—To
Fee or Not To Fee?, THE BANKER, Feb. 1, 2012, at 88. But see Odysseas Papadimitriou,
The Rise in Bank Fees Is Over, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR BLOG (Nov. 21, 2011),
http://www.csmonitor.com/Business/Saving-Money/2011/1121/The-rise-in-bank-fees-isover (predicting that competition for customers will prevent banks from raising account
fees).
18. Aaron Passman, How Kristen Christian Came to Launch Bank Transfer Day,
CREDIT UNION J., Dec. 19, 2011, at 1, 23.
19. See, e.g., Pamela Yip, People Power Vanquishes Debit Card Fee, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, Nov. 7, 2011, at 1D.
20. See E. Scott Reckard, Debit Cards Poised to Get Much Costlier, L.A. TIMES, June
25, 2011, at B1.
21. Bank Transfer Day, http://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=298049023545
172 (Oct. 8, 2011, 1:30 PM); see also Passman, supra note 18, at 1, 23 (quoting Ms.
Christian, who stated: “It bothered me very deeply at a moral level, because it was clear to
me that Bank of America was targeting those who couldn’t afford to pay the fee.”); Stuart
Pfeifer & E. Scott Reckard, Interest Grows in “Bank Transfer Day,” L.A. TIMES, Nov. 5,
2011, at B1 (“Christian said BofA’s planned fee bothered her because it exempted wealthy
customers who met certain balance requirements, meaning it would hit people who could
least afford it.”).
22. Bank Transfer Day, http://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=298049023545
172 (Oct. 9, 2011, 4:31 PM); see also Gary Rivlin, Boycott Your Bank!, THE DAILY BEAST
(Nov. 3, 2011, 10:02 PM EDT), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2011/11/03/kristenchristian-s-bank-transfer-day-puts-withdrawal-squeeze-on-banks.html.
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Others take the essence of Ms. Christian’s argument a step further.
They assert that banks’ transaction account pricing results in regressive
cross-subsidization. They claim that high account fees paid by the poor
cross-subsidize “free” transaction accounts for the wealthy. For example
Professors John Campbell, Howell Jackson, Brigitte Madrian, and Peter
Tufano assert that:
Bank customers who are attracted to initial low rates on checking
accounts but fail to read the fine print on overdraft fees . . . tend
to be very profitable. In a competitive market for financial
services, these profits are typically passed on to other customers
in the form of reduced bank charges and lower mortgage rates.
Naive (often poor and uneducated) customers can end up
subsidizing sophisticated customers.23
Others use even more strident rhetoric. According to Reuters writer
Felix Salmon, “[c]hecking is never free, but in recent years banks have
been able to conjure the illusion of free through a system of regressive
cross-subsidies, where the poor pay massive overdraft fees and thereby
allow the rich to pay nothing.”24
23. John Y. Campbell et al., Making Financial Markets Work For Consumers, HARV.
BUS. REV., July–Aug. 2011, at 47, 50; see also Peter A. Alces & Jason M. Hopkins,
Carrying a Good Joke Too Far, 83 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 879, 890 (2008) (arguing that
“myopic customers who unknowingly pay hidden fees and account charges” overpay for
transaction account services thereby creating a “subsidy” for “sophisticated customers”);
Stephanie J. Weber, Note, Excessive Bank Fees—Theories of Liability and the Need for
Legislative Action, 25 U. MEM. L. REV. 1439, 1477 (1995) (arguing that banks give “‘good
customers’ preferential [fee] treatment” and pass “the cost of bank service . . . on to lesspreferred customers”); Bank Fees Carry Risks, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Dec. 3, 2009, at B7
(arguing that because “one quarter of customers pay all [transaction account fees],” those
customers are “essentially subsidizing the other three quarters” of accountholders that
receive “free” checking); Reckard, supra note 20, at B1 (“For years, banks subsidized most
debit card holders by levying heavy fees on . . . overdrawn consumers.”). Even Wikipedia
seems to have taken as truth that cross-subsidization occurs among transaction
accountholders, although its description of cross-subsidization in this context is not fulsome.
Cross Subsidization, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cross_subsidization (last
updated Nov. 9, 2012) (“An example of cross subsidization often occurs in the banking
industry. Fees associated with maintaining a low account balance (below $1,000 for
example) are charged to these customers to maintain their profitability.”).
24. Felix Salmon, Interchange and Free Checking, REUTERS (June 17, 2010),
http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2010/06/17/interchange-and-free-checking/; see also
G.D. Gearino, Dealing with Collateral Damage, BUS.-N.C., Feb. 1, 2011, at 37, 41
(“Basically, the poor fool who swiped his debit card for a Starbucks double latte when he
was down to his last two dollars in the bank—and was subsequently dinged with a big
overdraft fee—paid for his neighbor’s checking account.”); Kevin Drum, Robbing the Poor
to Give Air Miles to the Rich, MOTHER JONES (June 17, 2010 10:23 AM PDT),
http://motherjones.com/kevin-drum/2010/06/robbing-poor-give-air-miles-rich (stating that
“overdraft and interchange fees [are] basically surreptitious ways for the poor to subsidize
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If transaction account fees cross-subsidize wealthy customers, that
pricing could contribute to social problems. In addition to placing an unfair
burden on poor accountholders, high fees could price some poor consumers
out of the transaction account market.25 Without access to transaction
accounts these “unbanked” and “underbanked”26 consumers turn to a
variety of costly and sometimes predatory financial products like check
cashing services, money orders, and prepaid cards.27 Such a result would
be particularly intolerable if more efficient account fee pricing could lower
the cost of transaction account services for poor consumers.
Unsurprisingly then, regressive cross-subsidization in transaction
account pricing is often offered as a justification for regulatory transaction
the rich”); Ron Lieber & Andrew Martin, Overspending on Debit Cards Is Painful, but Not
for Banks, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2009, at A1 (“At the moment, people who pay overdraft fees
help subsidize the free accounts of those who do not.”).
25. “[T]he most common reason persons cite for lacking a [transaction] account is not
having enough money to be able to afford the costs of account ownership.” Michael S.
Barr, Banking the Poor, 21 YALE J. ON REG. 121, 131 (2004) (citing numerous sources); see
also Rourke O’Brien, “We Don’t Do Banks”: Financial Lives of Families on Public
Assistance, 19 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 485, 488 (2012) (discussing a former bank
customer who discontinued his transaction account due to overdraft fees); Ebonya
Washington, The Impact of Banking and Fringe Banking Regulation on the Number of
Unbanked Americans, 41 J. HUM. RESOURCES 106, 110 (2006) (summarizing the results of
three surveys of consumers who did not have bank accounts). Of course, there are other
reasons that some consumers do not have bank accounts. For example, some may live far
from a bank branch, may be uncomfortable entering banks, or may lack the needed
documentation to open an account. See Barr, supra, at 184; 2011 FDIC NATIONAL SURVEY
OF UNBANKED AND UNDERBANKED HOUSEHOLDS 26–27 (2012), available at
http://www.fdic.gov/householdsurvey/2012_unbankedreport.pdf [hereinafter FDIC, 2011
UNBANKED SURVEY].
26. “Unbanked” is usually defined to encompass those consumers who do not have a
checking or savings account. See FDIC, 2011 UNBANKED SURVEY, supra note 25, at 4 n.2.
“Underbanked” refers to those who have a checking or savings account, but still “rely on
alternative financial services.” Id. This Article, however, focuses only on transaction
(checking) accounts. It does not consider savings accounts because savings accounts
typically allow only six transactions from the account per month. See Regulation D, 12
C.F.R. § 204.2(d)(2) (2012) (allowing an account to be classified as a savings account for
reserve purposes only if “the depositor is permitted or authorized to make no more than six
transfers and withdrawals, or a combination of such transfers and withdrawals, per calendar
month or statement cycle”).
27. See Washington, supra note 25, at 109; see also Candice Choi, Living Without a
Bank: Fee, Not Free: Plethora of Charges and Inconvenience Price to Pay, HOUS. CHRON.,
Oct. 4, 2010, at A8 (providing a first-person account of living without a transaction
account). Because of the prevalence of transaction account-based payment systems and the
lack of reasonably priced alternatives, former Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers
described transaction accounts as “the most basic link to the mainstream economy.” Press
Release, Lawrence H. Summers, Sec’y Treas., Remarks at CFPI Coalition: Extending the
Frontier of Capital (Jan. 27, 2000), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/pressreleases/Pages/ls350.aspx.
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account price reforms. Some proposals suggest that the government more
heavily regulate transaction account pricing to eliminate regressive crosssubsidization.28 Other proposals recommend that regulators require banks
to provide low-income consumers free or low-cost transaction accounts29—
a policy that could result in progressive cross-subsidization. Unfortunately,
little research has examined whether transaction account pricing structures
actually result in regressive cross-subsidization.
Earlier scholarship has addressed the issue of cross-subsidization in
financial service pricing, but none of this scholarship focuses directly on
cross-subsidization among consumer transaction accounts. For example,
some assert that consumers who make purchases with cash cross-subsidize
consumers who pay with credit cards.30 Other scholarship focuses on
whether other bank customers subsidize (or are subsidized by) consumer
transaction accounts. In particular, recent debate has focused on whether
debit card interchange fees charged to merchants subsidize consumer
28. See Campbell et al., supra note 23, at 50 (suggesting that the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau address efficiency and fairness issues raised by transaction account crosssubsidization).
29. See, e.g., JOHN P. CASKEY, FRINGE BANKING: CHECK-CASHING OUTLETS,
PAWNSHOPS, AND THE POOR 131–32 (1994) (advocating basic transaction accounts targeted
to appeal to low-income consumers); Christopher Choe, Bringing in the Unbanked off the
Fringe: The Bank on San Francisco Model and the Need for Public and Private
Partnership, 8 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 365, 392 (2009) (suggesting that the federal
government partner with banks to ensure that the poor have access to basic banking
services); Felix Salmon, How to Reform Overdraft Fees, REUTERS, (July 7, 2009),
http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2009/07/07/how-to-reform-overdraft-fees/ (suggesting
that banks be “required by law to offer simple no-frills checking accounts for customers
who can’t meet minimum-balance requirements and don’t want to pay monthly checkingaccount fees”). Cf. Michael A. Stegman et al., Toward a More Performance-Driven Service
Test: Strengthening Basic Banking Services Under the Community Reinvestment Act, 9 GEO.
J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 405 (2002) (arguing that the regulators use the Community
Reinvestment Act as a vehicle to encourage banks to provide deposit accounts to lowincome consumers).
30. See, e.g., Adam J. Levitin, Priceless? The Social Costs of Credit Card Merchant
Restraints, 45 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 1 (2008) (contending that “credit card rewards
programs are funded in part by a highly regressive, sub rosa subsidization of affluent credit
consumers by poor cash consumers”); Adam J. Levitin, The Antitrust Super Bowl:
America’s Payment Systems, No-Surcharge Rules, and the Hidden Costs of Credit, 3
BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 265, 302–05 (2005) (summarizing an earlier study, John M. Barron et
al., Discounts for Cash in Retail Gasoline Marketing, 10 CONTEM. ECON. ISSUES 89 (1992),
as quantifying the cross-subsidization between cash and credit card consumers in the retail
gasoline market); Scott Schuh et al., Who Gains and Who Loses from Credit Card Payment?
Theory and Calibrations, FED. RESERVE BANK OF BOSTON PUB. POL’Y DISCUSSION PAPER
NO. 10-3, at 44–45 (Aug. 31, 2010), available at http://www.bos.frb.org/economic/
ppdp/2010/ppdp1003.pdf (quantifying “the transfer between cash buyers and credit card
buyers” and the “the transfer between low-income and high-income households” in the U.S.
payments market).
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transaction accounts.31 Yet, there have not been any recent efforts to
comprehensively analyze cross-subsidization among groups of consumer
transaction accountholders.32 This Article fills that gap.
Contrary to common assumption, there is little reason to believe—
either theoretically or empirically—that regressive cross-subsidization
exists in the transaction account market. At the same time, however,
existing account fee regulation is inconsistent and contradictory. Some
regulations encourage fee structures with high overdrafts and other
“penalty”-type fees while other regulations simultaneously discourage such
fees. This Article recommends that instead of focusing on crosssubsidization, policymakers should work to establish a coherent theory of
transaction account fee regulation. A coherent theory of fee regulation
could correct this inconsistency and provide clear direction for banks. The
Article proceeds in five parts.
Part I reviews the economic theory of cross-subsidization. It explains
that cross-subsidization is more than charging different prices to different
groups of consumers. A cross-subsidy exists only when one group of
consumers pays less than the incremental cost of the service and another
group pays more than the stand-alone cost of service.
Part II discusses the structure of transaction accounts. It explains that
banks earn income from transaction accounts in two primary ways: by
investing the deposits (often in the form of loans to other customers) and by
charging account fees. High-balance accounts generate more investment
income. Because, other things being equal, a bank earns more from a highbalance account than a low-balance account, banks may choose pricing
structures that charge low-balance accounts more fees. Banks that price
low-balance accounts differently than high-balance accounts are not
necessarily creating a cross-subsidy.
31. See generally Barbara Pacheco & Richard Sullivan, Interchange Fees in Credit and
Debit Card Markets: What Role for Public Authorities?, 91 ECON. REV. 87, 93–100 (2006)
(discussing current economic theory underpinning interchange fees).
32. Earlier scholarship examined the existence of cross-subsidization in transaction
accounts during a period when regulations prohibited banks from paying interest on deposit
accounts. See, e.g., Sherrill Shaffer, Cross-Subsidization in Checking Accounts, 15 J.
MONEY, CREDIT, & BANKING 100, 103 (1984); see also infra Part III.B.2 (discussing this
earlier scholarship). However, the deposit interest rates are now largely unregulated. See
Prohibition Against Payment of Interest on Demand Deposits, 76 Fed. Reg. 42,015, at 42015-20 (July 18, 2011). Thus, a re-examination of cross-subsidization in transaction
accounts is warranted. While many sources have made claims of regressive-cross
subsidization (see supra notes 23 and 24), none of these sources contain detailed analysis to
support such claims. Their charges seem based primarily on the fact that low-balance
accounts tend to incur overdraft fees while higher-balanced account do not. See supra notes
23–24, and 65. Yet, as explained, in Part I, this is not enough to substantiate the existence
of regressive cross-subsidization.
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Part III examines transaction account market inefficiencies that might
explain cross-subsidization among transaction accountholders. It examines
information deficiencies, regulations, and agency problems in transaction
accounts. It concludes that the current transaction account market provides
theoretical explanations for both regressive and progressive crosssubsidization among transaction accountholder groups. For example, the
Community Reinvestment Act33 might encourage banks to cross-subsidize
some transaction accounts for poor consumers. At the same time, bank
management may subsidize rich accountholders in order to increase bank
size, thereby maximizing management bonuses or creating financial
institutions that are too big to fail.
Part III also examines the impact of current account fee regulations,
concluding that these regulations provide conflicting instruction to banks.
On the one hand, the Truth in Savings Act34 and Office of the Comptroller
of the Currency regulations35 encourage banks to adopt high overdraft fees.
On the other hand, recent Federal Reserve regulations make it more
difficult for banks to charge overdraft fees on debit card transactions.36
Because regulations conflict, it is difficult to determine the impact such
regulations have on account pricing and cross-subsidization.
Part IV examines existing empirical evidence concerning transaction
account prices and costs. It concludes that some consumers who pay
numerous overdraft fees may pay more than the stand-alone cost of
providing overdraft service to high overdraft accounts. However, it also
concludes that most high-balance accounts generate enough investment
income to cover the incremental cost of transaction account services. Thus,
high-balance accounts are not receiving a subsidy from consumers who pay
numerous overdraft fees. Using account balance as a proxy for wealth,
there is insufficient evidence to conclude that poor accountholders crosssubsidize rich accountholders.
Given the lack of conclusive evidence of regressive crosssubsidization among transaction accountholders, Part V recommends that
those seeking transaction account fee regulation look beyond the crosssubsidization argument. In particular, fee regulation could benefit from a
coherent governing philosophy. Laws and regulations adopted in the
twentieth century encourage high overdraft fees. This regulation was
driven by the theory that avoidable penalty-type fees are more consumerfriendly than unavoidable monthly maintenance fees. More recent

33.
34.
35.
36.

Community Reinvestment Act of 1977, 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-08 (Supp. 2011).
Truth in Savings Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 4301-13 (Supp. 2011).
12 C.F.R. § 7.4002 (2012).
Id. at § 205.17.
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regulation discourages overdraft fees. This regulation is driven by a
philosophy that upfront, but unavoidable, maintenance fees are more
consumer friendly because they are more transparent than penalty-type
fees. Allegations of cross-subsidization simply hide this fundamental
disagreement in account pricing philosophy. A coherent theory of fee
regulation could correct regulatory inconsistency and provide clear
direction to banks. Clearer instruction to banks could encourage clearer
account choices for consumers.
I.

CROSS-SUBSIDIZATION

Cross-subsidization is “[t]he provision of a good or service at a loss,
which is met by the supplier from profits made on other goods and
services.”37 When discussing implications of cross-subsidization in terms
of social welfare, it is sometimes more useful to think about the groups of
consumers who purchase bundles of goods or services.38 Does one
consumer group pay higher prices in order to facilitate lower prices paid by
another consumer group?
In a perfectly efficient competitive market, cross-subsidization would
not occur. Consider a handyman that provides both plumbing and
electrical services. If the handyman charges those who need plumbing
service a price that cross-subsidizes those who need electrical service, the
consumers needing plumbing service will simply find another handyman
who sells that service at a lower price.39 A profit maximizing handyman
will provide plumbing service up to the point where the marginal cost of
providing the service equals the marginal revenue generated by the service.
A. Market Inefficiencies
Cross-subsidization potentially occurs in markets that are not perfectly
efficient. Cross-subsidization can occur in at least three types of situations.
First, cross-subsidization might occur because a service provider lacks
37. THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 101 (3d ed. 2009); see also Gerald R.
Faulhaber, Cross-Subsidization: Pricing in Public Enterprises, 65 AM. ECON. REV. 966, 966
(1975) (explaining that a cross-subsidy exists when the “price structure for the
multicommodity enterprise ‘unduly’ favor[s] the consumers of one commodity at the
expense of the purchasers of another commodity”).
38. Gerald R. Faulhaber & Stephen B. Levinson, Subsidy-Free Prices and Anonymous
Equity, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 1083, 1083 (1981).
39. See Gerald R. Faulhaber, Cross-Subsidy Analysis with More than Two Services, 1 J.
COMPETITION L. & ECON. 441, 442 (2005) (“Customers of any product or service who faced
prices that forced them to pay too much (thereby subsidizing a more favored customer
group) would soon find competitors willing to offer equivalent service at lower prices.”).
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sufficient information to price its services according to the costs of
providing that service.40 For example, consider a simplified health
insurance situation. A group of similarly situated healthy consumers wants
to purchase health insurance. Because neither the consumers nor the
insurance company can accurately predict who will become sick in the
future, all the consumers pay the same price. Eventually some people in
the pool will become sick, while others remain healthy. Thus, the healthy
people subsidize the unhealthy people.41
Second, cross-subsidization might occur because regulatory
constraints prevent the service provider from transferring costs to some
customers.42 For example, regulators seeking to ensure that all consumers
have access to electricity might require an electricity supplier to service
some consumers at a loss. “This loss on some sales is financially feasible
only when the [service provider] is permitted to make up for it by obtaining
higher profits on its other sales.”43 In order to preserve this type of crosssubsidization, the service provider must be “protected from price
competition and free entry of new competitors in its other, more profitable
markets (in which it charges the higher prices that subsidize the financing
of the mandated low prices).”44
Third, cross-subsidization might occur when agency problems arise.45
Although directors and officers are often assumed to be maximizing

40. See Kenneth Fjell, A Cross-Subsidy Classification Framework, 21 J. PUB. POL’Y
265, 273 (2001) (“[C]ross-subsidization may also take place inadvertently, for instance due
to weak management accounting systems, possibly because of managerial limitations or
because they are not judged cost-effective. In other cases the cause of inadvertent crosssubsidization might be more fundamental, as in multiservice firms with high sunk costs and
low variable costs such as telecommunications.”); Shaffer, supra note 32, at 103 (noting that
a bank’s failure to adjust the price of checking accounts based on the cost of providing those
accounts “may result either from lack of information . . . , from a regulatory constraint, or
from a profit incentive not to use the information”).
41. See Mary Crossley, Discrimination Against the Unhealthy in Health Insurance, 54
U. KAN. L. REV. 73, 77 (2005) (describing health insurance as a system of “mutual aid”
where “the majority of members who are fortunate enough to remain healthy subsidize the
care of those members who become sick or suffer injuries”).
42. Shaffer, supra note 32, at 103.
43. WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & ALAN S. BLINDER, ECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES AND POLICY 275
(Alex von Rosenburg et al. eds., 11th ed. 2009).
44. Id.
45. Agency problems arise when an agent is employed to act on behalf of a principle,
for example, when management is employed by a company to act on behalf of a firm’s
shareholders. “If both parties to the relationship are utility maximizers there is good reason
to believe that the agent will not always act in the best interests of the principal.” Michael
C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs
and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976).
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shareholder value,46 in some instances management may instead act in its
own self-interest. For example, if salaries of managers are positively
correlated with firm size, managers may attempt to maximize their salaries
by offering some products at a loss in order to increase the firm’s size of
operations.47 On the other hand, management in some cases might also
pursue “goals such as generating goodwill in personal relations unrelated to
the business, [or] providing (unprofitable) services to charity.”48
B. Establishing Cross-Subsidization
Even when policymakers recognize conditions that might facilitate
cross-subsidization, determining whether cross-subsidization occurs can be
difficult.49 Because cross-subsidization analysis involves comparing the
price a consumer pays with the cost of providing the service, the first step
is determining the cost of providing the service. While there are many
possible ways to measure cost, the most widely accepted approach for
measuring cross-subsidization is attributed to Gerald R. Faulhaber.50 He

46. See, e.g., Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) (“A business
corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders.”); Kelli
A. Alces, Beyond the Board of Directors, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 783, 796 (2011) (“Both
directors and officers are supposed to working toward the goal of shareholder wealth
maximization.”); Stephen M. Bainbridge, In Defense of the Shareholder Wealth
Maximization Norm: A Reply to Professor Green, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1423, 1423
(1993) (“Shareholder wealth maximization long has been the fundamental norm which
guides U.S. corporate decisionmakers.”).
47. See Fjell, supra note 40, at 274.
48. Id. at 272.
49. David Heald, Contrasting Approaches to the ‘Problem’ of Cross Subsidy, 7 MGMT.
ACCT. RES. 53, 54 (1996) (“[C]ross subsidies are hard to measure because they are hard to
define, and hard to define because they are hard to measure.”).
50. See David L. Kaserman & John W. Mayo, Cross-Subsidies in Telecommunications:
Roadblocks on the Road to More Intelligent Telephone Pricing, 11 YALE J. ON REG. 119,
132 (1994) (citing “Faulhaber’s widely-accepted definition of a cross-subsidy”); Eric Ralph,
Cross-subsidy: A Novice’s Guide to the Arcane 3 (July 27, 1992), available at
http://www.ekonomicsllc.com/Ralph1992Cross-subsidy.pdf (noting that “the most widely
accepted definition of cross-subsidy is commonly attributed to Faulhaber”); Mark Sievers &
Brooks Albery, Strategic Allocation of Overhead: The Application of Traditional Predation
Tests to Multiproduct Firms, 60 ANTITRUST L.J. 757, 769 n.28 (1992) (“The most widely
accepted economic definition of ‘subsidy-free’ pricing is [attributable to] . . .
Faulhaber . . . .”). See generally Faulhaber, supra note 37 (explaining the Faulhaber
approach). In spite of the wide academic acceptance of the Faulhaber approach, regulatory
bodies have sometimes measured cross-subsidization by asking whether each consumer
group covers its fully distributed costs.
See Warren G. Lavey, Innovative
Telecommunications Services and the Benefit of the Doubt, 27 CAL. W. L. REV. 51, 71
(1990) (noting that the FCC used the fully distributed costs standard to set telephone rates
prior to 1985). The fully distributed costs approach has “been thoroughly discredited in
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describes cross-subsidy as the absence of subsidy-free prices. Subsidy-free
prices require two conditions. First, “revenues from the service must not
exceed [the] stand alone cost” of providing that service.51 If one group
pays more than the stand-alone cost of service, this group would be better
off seeking an alternative arrangement from a provider that services only
that group and prices according to costs.52 Second, “adding a service
resulting in an incremental cost must also result in an increase in revenues
that is at least as large [as the cost].”53 Each group of consumers must
generate at least enough income to cover the marginal cost of service for
that group. If the two conditions are met, prices are considered subsidyfree and no cross-subsidization exists.
Faulhaber’s approach does not conceptualize a single subsidy-free
price. Rather, it allows for a range of subsidy-free prices “bounded on the
lower end by average incremental cost and on the upper end by the per-unit
stand-alone costs.”54
Applying the Faulhaber approach can be challenging. If two services
have complementary or competing demands, it can be difficult to determine
whether the revenue (including the net revenue changes attributable to the
new service) exceeds the incremental cost of providing the new service.55
In addition, it can sometimes be difficult to determine the hypothetical
stand-alone cost of providing a service to a group of consumers.56
C. Cross-Subsidization and Public Policy
Even when cross-subsidization clearly occurs, we are left with
questions about the appropriateness of a particular pricing structure. In
some circumstances, cross-subsidization may be viewed as socially
desirable. For example, regulated cross-subsidization may help rural users
have access to reasonably-priced mail service—a result that some could

legal, economic, and managerial accounting literature.” Steve G. Parsons, The Economic
Necessity of an Increased Subscriber Line Charge (SLC) in Telecommunications, 48 ADMIN.
L. REV. 227, 229 (1996).
51. Fjell, supra note 40, at 269 (citing Faulhaber, supra note 37).
52. Ralph, supra note 50, at 3–4.
53. Fjell, supra note 40, at 268 (citing Faulhaber, supra note 37).
54. Mark L. Burton et al., Common Costs and Cross-Subsidies: Misestimation Versus
Misallocation, 27 CONTEMP. ECON. POL’Y 193, 194 (2009).
55. Fjell, supra note 40, at 268–69; see also ALFRED E. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF
REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTIONS 71–83 (1988) (discussing problems with
defining and measuring marginal costs).
56. Heald, supra note 49, at 57–58 (describing problems with determining stand-alone
costs).
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view as socially desirable.57 On the other hand, cross-subsidization is
sometimes viewed as fundamentally unfair because some consumers pay
more than the stand-alone cost of the product.58 Absent some market flaw
or restraint, competitors would enter the market and provide the overpaying
group with service at a lower cost. When the cost burden of a crosssubsidy falls on a disadvantaged class, cross-subsidization is usually seen
as undesirable.59 Finally, some oppose cross-subsidization because it can
distort consumers’ decisions concerning the consumption of services. If
some services are subsidized, consumers may over-use these services and
cause resources to be distributed inefficiently.60
Tolerance of an existing cross-subsidization might also depend on the
reason or reasons that it exists. We might tolerate cross-subsidizations that
occur due to lack of information because without sufficient information it
would be difficult to correct the subsidy.61 In the case of regulationproduced cross-subsidization, we might ask whether an existing price
structure is helping those whom it was designed to help. In the case of
cross-subsidization caused by agency problems, we might ask whether the
cross-subsidization is best corrected by efforts to eliminate the agency
problem, or whether price regulation would be more effective.
Just as cross-subsidies are not necessarily unfair, subsidy-free prices
are not necessarily fair.62 Pricing structures that are not cross-subsidizing
may still often result in one group of consumers bearing a larger share of
the fixed costs associated with a particular service. In these circumstances,
price setters and policymakers might legitimately debate whether measures
should be taken to encourage a different pricing structure.
57. See R. Richard Geddes, Policy Watch: Reform of the U.S. Postal Service, 19 J.
ECON. PERSPS. 217, 224 (2005) (“The traditional argument is that a government monopoly
over letter delivery will ensure that profits from dense, lucrative urban routes can crosssubsidize money-losing rural routes, whereas private competitors might not provide delivery
to remote areas.”).
58. Ralph, supra note 50, at 4 (“[C]ommon sense suggests it is unjust that a group
should have to pay more than its standalone costs.”).
59. For example, in evaluating whether law student tuition unfairly cross-subsidized
professor research, Professor Edward Rubin observed that “[t]he term ‘cross-subsidy,’ is a
sophisticated way to express that most corrosive but unsophisticated of political or
economic complaints—that ‘somebody is doing something bad to somebody else.’” Edward
Rubin, Should Law Schools Support Faculty Research?, 17 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 139,
140 (2008) (quoting Heald, supra note 49, at 54).
60. David B. Humphrey et al., Cost Recovery and Pricing of Payment Services: Theory,
Methods, and Experience 3 (The World Bank, Working Paper No. 1833, 1997).
61. In that situation it might be impossible to gather enough information to confirm the
existence of a cross-subsidy.
62. Faulhaber, supra note 37, at 967 (noting that “a subsidy-free price structure is not
necessarily welfare maximizing; nor are we entitled to assume that such price structures are
morally superior to their subsidy-prone fellows on grounds of social justice”).
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TRANSACTION ACCOUNTS

Notwithstanding the ambiguous policy implications of crosssubsidization, the repeated claim that transaction account pricing results in
regressive cross-subsidization63 warrants closer inspection.
Using
Faulhaber’s definition of cross-subsidy, transaction account pricing is
subsidy-free if: (1) no group of consumers pays more than the stand-alone
cost of providing account services to that group of consumers, and (2) each
group of consumers paid a price equal or greater to the incremental cost to
the bank of providing the transaction account service.64 Both conditions
require analysis of all costs incurred and the income earned by banks in
providing transaction account services. Yet some who assert that crosssubsidization occurs in transaction account pricing focus primarily on a
single source of income from transaction accounts: the fees.65
This Section discusses the structure of transaction accounts and how
that structure impacts both the cost of providing account services and the
prices paid for account services. It explains that if banks priced transaction
accounts according to the cost of providing those accounts, low-balance
accounts (likely belonging to low-income consumers) would pay more fees
because low-balance accounts generate little other income for the banks.
However, the higher fees paid by low-balance accounts would not
necessarily be cross-subsidizing high-balance accounts. High-balance
accounts allow banks to generate investment income that offsets the cost of
providing account services.
A. Banks’ Cost
Banking laws define a “transaction account” as “a deposit or account
on which the depositor or accountholder is permitted to make withdrawals
by negotiable or transferable instrument, payment orders of withdrawal,
telephone transfers, or other similar items for the purpose of making
payments or transfers to third persons or others.”66 The term transaction
account “includes demand deposits, negotiable order of withdrawal
accounts, savings deposits subject to automatic transfers, and share draft
accounts.”67 In essence, a bank holds money for a customer and uses that

63. See supra notes 23–24 and accompanying text.
64. See supra Part I.B.
65. See, e.g., Lieber & Martin, supra note 24, at A1 (“[P]eople who pay overdraft fees
help subsidize the free accounts of those who do not.”); Salmon, supra note 24 (arguing that
“the poor pay massive overdraft fees and thereby allow the rich to pay nothing”).
66. 12 U.S.C. § 461(b)(1)(C) (Supp. 2011).
67. Id. Credit cards are not considered “transaction accounts” because credit cards
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money to make payments at the customer’s direction.
Banks incur a variety of costs in providing transaction account
services. “These costs reflect the expense of processing transactions;
providing monthly statements; investing in payment system technology and
software; paying the cost of tellers, ATMs, and online banking; staffing call
centers; complying with a myriad of regulations; ensuring privacy and data
protection; and preventing fraud and covering fraud losses.”68 Some banks
also offer transaction accounts that pay interest on account balances.69 That
interest must be considered a cost of the account.
Of non-interest costs, payment processing expenses may be the largest
cost.70 The payment processing costs associated with any given transaction
account depend on the type of payments used and how many payments are
made. Even though many paper checks are “electronified” at some point in
the check processing process,71 checks are still more costly to process than
debit card payments or electronic payments.72 Other things being equal,
transaction accounts with more payments are more costly for banks than
accounts with fewer payments.
Payment fraud and uncollected overdrafts also have the potential to be
major expenses of transaction accounts. Payment fraud arises when
someone makes an unauthorized transaction using a payment device. In
some situations, banks can pass this loss back to either the customer who
deposited the payment73 or the customer who allowed the fraudulent

make payments using credit extended by the financial institution, rather than by debiting an
account where a customer previously deposited money. See RONALD J. MANN, PAYMENT
SYSTEMS AND OTHER FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS: CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS 200
(5th ed. 2011).
68. Am. Bankers Ass’n, The Cost of a Checking Account (June 2010) available at at
http://www.aba.com/aba/documents/press/CostofCheckingAccountsJune2010.pdf.
Some
banks also offer debit card reward programs for consumers who use their card frequently.
However, these programs are becoming less common. Teresa Dixon Murray, After a Year
of Changes, Banks Brace for More Rules, Reforms and Hits to the Bottom Line: Consumers
Starting to See the Effects of Financial Overhaul Law, THE PLAIN DEALER, July 24, 2011, at
D1.
69. TIMOTHY W. KOCH & S. SCOTT MACDONALD, BANK MANAGEMENT 401 (7th ed.
2010).
70. Cf. Shaffer, supra note 32, at 100 (“Check processing costs account for a substantial
portion of the total checking account expenses for commercial banks.”).
71. Stephen Quinn & William Roberds, The Evolution of the Check as a Means of
Payment: A Historical Survey, 94(4) ECON. REV. 1, 23–24 (2008).
72. KOCH & MACDONALD, supra note 69, at 402–03; Amelia H. Boss, Convergence in
Electronic Banking: Technological Convergence, Systems Convergence, Legal
Convergence, 2 DREXEL L. REV. 63, 69 n.19 (2009).
73. For example, if a customer deposits a check that is later returned as unpaid, a
depositary bank that has already provisionally credited the customer’s account may charge
back the amount of the check to the customer. U.C.C. § 4-214(c) (2011).
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payment to be made from his or her account.74 Sometimes, however, legal
rules or practical considerations require that the bank bears the loss. One
study found that in 2006, banks incurred $1.66 billion in fraud losses
associated with payments by check, debit card, or ACH system.75
Uncollected overdrafts arise when an accountholder overdraws the account
and fails to deposit sufficient money to cover the overdraft. If a bank is
unable to collect the balance through some other means, the bank must
charge-off the account.76 An FDIC Survey found that in 2006, banks’
charge-offs associated with deposit accounts amounted to “12.6 percent of
total gross loan and lease charge-offs reported.”77
B. Banks’ Income
While banks incur costs in providing transaction accounts, they also
earn money from those accounts. There are three ways banks can earn
money from transaction accounts.
First, banks can lend out the deposited money, thereby earning
interest.78 Indeed, this is often thought of as the quintessential business of
banking: borrowing money from depositors at a low interest rate and then
lending it out at a higher interest rate. The amount a bank can earn from
lending deposits depends on a number of factors. Regulation requires that
banks hold part of their deposits in reserve.79 Banks must hold reserve
amounts in cash or in accounts at the Federal Reserve or a correspondent
bank.80 Thus, banks are not free to lend all deposits. To the extent that a
bank can lend deposits, the amount earned depends on the interest rate
spread. The bank must lend at a rate higher than the rate it pays the
depositor. Deposit availability, loan demand, and future interest rate

74. For example, a customer whose negligence results in a thief stealing his checkbook
and cashing forged checks may be partly responsible for the loss. U.C.C. § 3-406(b).
75. Richard J. Sullivan, Can Smart Cards Reduce Payments Fraud and Identity Theft?,
93 ECON. REV. 1, 38 (2008).
76. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 266 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “charge off” as “[t]o
treat (an account receivable) as a loss or expense because payment is unlikely; to treat as a
bad debt”).
77. FDIC STUDY OF BANK OVERDRAFT PROGRAMS 62 (2008), available at
http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/overdraft/FDIC138_Report_Final_v508.pdf
[hereinafter FDIC, OVERDRAFT STUDY].
78. See KOCH & MACDONALD, supra note 69, at 403.
79. Regulation D, 12 C.F.R. §§ 204.1-.10 (2012). The amount of deposits each bank
must reserve depends on the amount of deposits held by the bank and the type of account in
which the deposit is held. Id. § 204.4.
80. See id. § 204.5. Banks earn relatively low rates of interest on deposits maintained at
the Federal Reserve. Id. § 204.10.
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forecasts all impact the interest rate spread.81 Assuming that neither the
reserve requirement nor the interest rate spread makes lending unprofitable,
the larger the average balance of a transaction account, the more a bank can
earn by lending.
Second, banks generate income by charging fees on transaction
accounts.82 As previously discussed, banks employ a wide variety of
account fees.83 A Government Accountability Office study found that in
2006, “consumers paid over $36 billion in various fees associated with
checking and savings accounts at depository institutions.”84
Third, transaction accounts can increase the demand for other bank
products and services.85 In some instances, when a bank entices a customer
to open a transaction account it may increase the likelihood that the bank
will be able to sell that same customer other products and services.86 For
example, transaction accountholders often choose to purchase checks from
their bank.87 The more transaction accounts a bank maintains, the more
checks the bank is likely to sell. Such cross-selling opportunities might
extend to bank products that are not directly linked to the transaction
account—like home mortgages, credit cards, and investment products. At
least some banks pursue transaction accounts as an opportunity to cross-sell
other products.88 Banks may find cross-selling more fruitful when targeted
toward wealthy accountholders.89 Nevertheless, research suggests that
81. See Nathan Powell, What the Yield Curve Does (and Doesn’t) Tell Us, FDIC FYI:
AN
UPDATE
ON
EMERGING
ISSUES
IN
BANKING
(Feb.
22,
2006),
http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/fyi/2006/022206fyi.html.
82. See KOCH & MACDONALD, supra note 69, at 403.
83. See supra notes 3–10 and accompanying text.
84. GAO, BANK FEES REPORT, supra note 3, at 1.
85. See Mike Branton, StrategyCorps, What to Do with Unprofitable Retail Checking
Accounts? (Dec. 2010), available at http://www.ababj.com/white-papers-2010/what-to-dowith-unprofitable-retail-checking-accounts.html.
86. See KOCH & MACDONALD, supra note 69, at 22, 655 (noting banks’ ability to crosssell consumer products).
87. Cf. Lee Conrad, Checks: Small Check Printer Goes Against Grain: Shrugs off
Concerns of Shrinking Check Volume, BANK TECH. NEWS, Oct. 3, 2005, at 1 (discussing
bank profit margins on check sales).
88. See Steve Garmhausen, Big Banks Gaining Retail Customers in Workplaces, AM.
BANKER, Dec. 29, 2010, at 2 (discussing Comercia Inc.’s efforts to target “select employee
groups” for transaction accounts and then cross-sell other products); Rick Rothacker, Bank
of America’s Plan: More Cross-Selling, Smaller Balance Sheet, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER,
Sept. 14, 2010 (discussing Bank of America’s efforts to cross-sell investment products to
bank customers).
89. See Shibo Li et al., Cross-Selling the Right Product to the Right Customer at the
Right Time, 48 J. MARKETING RES. 683, 694 (2011) (“Higher income increases the purchase
propensity [regardless of consumers’ state of financial maturity].”); Leonard J. Paas et al.,
Acquisition Patterns of Financial Products: A Longitudinal Investigation, 28 J. ECON.
PSYCHOL. 229, 237 (2007) (finding that “households with high incomes and assets are over-
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banks’ cross-selling efforts are unlikely to be consistently successful.90
In other instances, a transaction account might increase the demand
for services that are not purchased directly by the accountholder. For
example, when a transaction account customer uses his debit card to make
a purchase, the merchant will pay an “interchange” fee that in part flows
back to the accountholder’s bank.91 The more customers want to use debit
cards, the more merchants may be willing to pay for debit card
processing.92 And the more merchants that accept the card, the more
customers will want to use the card.93 In this way, the “network effect” of
having more consumers using debit cards produces value for the bank.94 If
banks are able to profit from interchange fees, then, other things being
equal, transaction accounts with more debit card transactions will be more
profitable than those with fewer debit card transactions.
Congress, however, recently limited banks’ ability to use the network
effect to generate income from consumer transaction accounts. Under a
provision of the Dodd-Frank Act popularly known as the Durbin
Amendment, the Federal Reserve gained power to regulate debit card
interchange fees—the fees banks charge to merchants for debit card
processing.95 Under the Durbin Amendment, interchange fees must “be
reasonable and proportional to the cost incurred by the issuer with respect
to the transaction.”96 In particular the Federal Reserve must distinguish
between “the incremental cost incurred by an issuer for the role of the

represented in segments with high [financial] product penetrations”); Michael S. Barr, An
Inclusive, Progressive National Savings and Financial Services Policy, 1 HARV. L. & POL’Y
REV. 161, 170–71 (2007) (noting that “lower-income households are unlikely to be the first
place [financial institutions] look for assets and cross-selling opportunities”).
90. See Rich Weissman, Upscale Marketing: It’s Not What You Think, 89 HOOSIER
BANKER 1, 2 (2005) (stating that “[m]ost traditionally defined upscale customers tend [to] be
either among the most profitable or the most unprofitable customers in the banks (and not in
the middle)”); Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Transformation of the U.S. Financial Services
Industry, 1975-2000: Competition, Consolidation, and Increased Risks, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV.
215, 432–33 (stating that “reports confirm that big banks have had very limited success in
cross-selling different types of financial services to consumers”).
91. Tim Mead et al., The Role of Interchange Fees on Debit and Credit Card
Transactions in the Payments System, ECON. BRIEF NO. 11-05 (FED. RESERVE BANK OF
RICHMOND) (2011).
92. Benjamin Klein et al., Competition in Two-Sided Markets: The Antitrust Economics
of Payment Card Interchange Fees, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 571, 580 (2006).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 577 (explaining that “network effects” occur when the supply and demand of
one product impact the demand of another related product, for example, where a
“newspaper publisher lowers reader prices and thereby increases readership, [thus]
increas[ing] demand for advertising in the newspaper”).
95. 15 U.S.C. § 1693o-2(a) (2011).
96. Id. § 1693o-2(a)(2).
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issuer in the authorization, clearance, or settlement of a particular
electronic debit transaction,” and “other costs incurred by an issuer which
are not specific to a particular electronic debit transaction.”97 The Federal
Reserve can consider incremental costs in setting the fee, but cannot
consider other costs.98 The Federal Reserve’s rules implementing the
Durbin Amendment limit debit interchange fees to no more than “21 cents”
plus “5 basis points multiplied by the value of the transaction.”99
Congress enacted the Durbin Amendment based on concerns that
“retailers and consumers [were] bear[ing] a disproportionate amount of
costs of the debit card system.”100 Others challenge the conclusion that
merchant fees were subsidizing consumer accounts, arguing that the
interchange fees were likely the result of efficient pricing strategies.101 In
any event, because future debit interchange fees must be focused on the
incremental cost of providing the service, it seems unlikely that banks will
be able to generate significant profits by encouraging transaction
accountholders to use debit cards thus boosting the demand for merchant
processing. As Professor Richard Epstein states, “[t]he implicit subtext of
[the Durbin Amendment] is that the banks can recoup the revenues they
lose in debit interchange from their own customers, in the terms of higher
rates for the various services they supply.”102 In other words, banks must
97. Id. § 1693o-2(a)(4).
98. Id.; see also Richard A. Epstein, The Constitutional Paradox of the Durbin
Amendment: How Monopolies are Offered Constitutional Protections Denied to
Competitive Firms, 63 FLA. L. REV. 1307, 1340 (2011) (noting that the Durbin Amendment
is “[a] system of price controls that is keyed to variable (or incremental) costs . . . [and] does
not afford the competitive firm any more opportunity to recover its fixed costs than [a]
public utility”).
99. 12 C.F.R. § 235.3(b) (2012). The interchange regulations do not apply to financial
institutions that have less than $10 billion in assets. Id. § 235.5(a). However, many believe
that market pressures and processing network policies will prevent smaller banks from
charging higher interchange fees. See Oversight of Dodd-Frank Implementation: A
Progress Report by the Regulators at the Half-Year Mark: Hearing Before the Comm. on
Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 112th Cong. 21 (2011) (testimony of Ben S. Bernanke,
Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.) (“By the statute, the smaller
institutions will be exempt from these restrictions, but there is the possibility that either
because merchants would not accept the more expensive cards or because networks would
not be willing to have a two-tiered pricing system, it is possible that in practice they would
not be exempt from the lower interchange fee.”).
100. TCF Nat’l Bank v. Bernanke, 643 F.3d 1158, 1164–65 (8th Cir. 2011) (affirming
the holding that the Durbin Amendment was rationally related to Congress’s concerns).
101. See Epstein, supra note 98, at 1314–24 (arguing that if debit cards were subsidized
by cash and check customers, merchants would strive to eliminate the subsidies to increase
their customer base, but the reverse is seen in practice).
102. Epstein, supra note 98, at 1326. Indeed, only politicians, including Senator Durbin,
seemed shocked when banks did raise their fees after the Durbin Amendment. See Eryk J.
Wachnik, “The Durbin Tax” and How the Banks Tried to Insure Their Bottom Line, 24
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look to the traditional sources of account income: investment of deposits
and fees.
C. The Natural Fee Difference
The fact that banks’ primary sources of account income are
investment and fees creates a situation where banks may efficiently price
accounts differently based on the account balance. If a bank prices each
transaction account to cover its costs, the bank may charge high-balance
accounts fewer fees because these accounts are capable of producing
investment income.103 In contrast, banks may charge low-balance accounts
more fees because investment income from these accounts will not cover
the cost of providing transaction services.104 Economics professors
Timothy Koch and Scott MacDonald note that this type of pricing creates a
“caste system of banking.”105 Under such a system:
Large depositors receive the highest rates, pay the lowest fees,
and often get free checking. They do not wait in long teller lines
and they receive more attention from their personal banker.
When they call a bank representative, they often quickly get a
live person on the line. Small depositors, by contrast, earn lower
rates, if any, on their small balances and pay higher fees, with
less personal service. When these customers call their bank—
particularly at large, transactions-based organizations—they will
be routinely routed from one electronic response to another and
will wait long periods to visit with an actual person.106
When banks charge fees for low-balance accounts, some consumers may
turn to fringe financial service providers instead of banks.107
While a pricing system that extracts fees from low-balance
accountholders may seem unfair to some,108 it does not necessarily imply
LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 318, 323–25 (2011).
103. Of course, such a pricing structure would not be the only rational way for a bank to
price a high-balance transaction account. A bank might instead choose to charge fees for
high-balance accounts and then pay the same accounts a higher interest rate on the deposited
balance.
104. This effect could be achieved with a variety of pricing structures. Customers could
be charged monthly fees depending on the balance of their account. Alternatively, a bank
could charge all accounts the same fees, but pay interest depending on the account balance.
Alternatively still, a bank could charge fees that are likely to be paid only by those with low
balances.
105. KOCH & MACDONALD, supra note 69, at 403.
106. Id.
107. See Barr, supra note 25, at 177–81 (noting that when accounts have high fees they
may make little “economic sense” for some people).
108. See Tiffany S. Lee, No More Abuse: The Dodd-Frank and Consumer Financial
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the existence of cross-subsidization among consumer groups. Under a
transaction account pricing structure that charges fees according to costs,
the poor may pay more fees because their accounts have lower balances
and generate less investment income. On the other hand, a transaction
account pricing structure that charges low-balance accounts more fees than
high-balance accounts is not necessarily subsidy-free. In any event, a
thorough examination of cross-subsidization among transaction
accountholders must evaluate not only account fees, but also income
generated by banks’ investment of deposits.
III.

TRANSACTION ACCOUNT MARKET INEFFICIENCIES

Keeping in mind both fee and investment income from transaction
accounts, this Part explores market inefficiencies that could theoretically
explain cross-subsidization among transaction accountholders. It focuses
on the factors, identified in Part I.A, that have potential to produce crosssubsidization: information deficiencies, regulatory constraints, and agency
problems.109 It concludes that the transaction account market has features
that could partially explain both regressive and progressive crosssubsidization. In particular, market entry restraints, interest rate regulation,
fee regulation, and the Community Reinvestment Act all have potential to
affect banks’ transaction account pricing.
A. Information Deficiencies
First, cross-subsidization might occur because banks lack the
information to price each transaction account strictly according to cost.110
At a minimum, banks do not know beforehand exactly which transaction
accounts will result in overdraft charge-offs. While historical data can help
banks predict the rate of charge-offs among various consumer groups, some
high credit risk consumers will not result in charge-offs. Conversely, some
low credit risk consumers will result in charge-offs. Thus, pricing
according to credit risk will not eliminate cross-subsidization.
Protection Act’s ‘Abusive’ Standard, 14 J. CONSUMER & COM. L. 118, 126 (2011) (stating
that because “[t]he most frequent users of overdraft programs are lower-income individuals
with less financial sophistication,” account pricing exploits low-income individuals).
109. In analyzing potential market imperfections, this Part, like the Article more broadly,
focuses on market imperfections that could produce cross-subsidization among transaction
account consumers, rather than cross-subsidization involving transaction account consumers
and other bank customers.
110. See Gregory F. Udell, Pricing Returned Check Charges Under Asymmetric
Information, 18 J. OF MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 495, 496 (1986) (“[I]t is not at all clear
that bankers have more than a very imperfect knowledge of [deposit] costs themselves.” ).
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Banks also lack advanced notice of the type and number of payments
a transaction account consumer will make in any given month. Banks
could cope with this lack of information by imposing a cost for each
transaction.111 However, such a pricing practice could be prohibitively
expensive to administer.112 In addition, because the full cost of each item
could depend on the amount of fixed costs assigned to each item, such
pricing would require an accurate projection of the total number of
transactions processed.
Finally, banks lack advanced notice of the amount of money that will
be in a transaction account at any given time. Banks can partially
counteract this lack of information by paying interest calculated daily.
However, for low-balance accounts, this mechanism will be ineffective in
recouping costs. For those accounts, banks could charge monthly access
fees depending on the account balance. This pricing mechanism is unlikely
to be perfectly efficient because banks would have to divide accountholders
into an administratively reasonable number of groups.
In sum, information deficiencies are likely to lead to some crosssubsidization among transaction accountholders. Determining whether this
cross-subsidization is progressive or regressive would be difficult because
the crux of the problem is a lack of knowledge. Furthermore, completely
eliminating cross-subsidization caused by information deficiencies is likely
to be cost-prohibitive or impossible.
B. Regulation
In contrast, any cross-subsidization caused by regulation should be
more easily identified—especially to the extent that specific regulations are
designed to impact banks’ transaction account pricing. This Part discusses
the numerous regulatory constraints that could lead to cross-subsidization
among transaction accountholders.
It begins by examining regulations that limit entry into the transaction
account market. Such restrictions could allow banks to overprice some (or
all) transaction accounts.
This Part then examines interest rate regulations. Although interest
rate regulations likely caused cross-subsidization in the past, there are few
current restrictions on the interest rates banks may pay on transaction
accounts.
Next, this Part examines fee regulations. Here, examination of the

111. Shaffer, supra note 32, at 100–01.
112. See id. at 103 (noting that a per-check charge could “entail[] additional costs, such
as record-keeping and tabulating expenses”).
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regulations reveals a somewhat surprising conflict. The Truth in Savings
Act and Office of the Comptroller of the Currency regulations encourage
banks to adopt high penalty-type fees like overdraft and return check
charges. These laws, coupled with the market entry restrictions and
consumer choice inefficiencies could lead to over-pricing of overdraft fees.
On the other hand, a new Federal Reserve regulation limits banks’ ability to
charge overdrafts on debit card transactions. This regulation seems aimed
at discouraging debit overdraft fees, thereby ameliorating the harm caused
by consumer tendencies to inefficiently choose transaction account
products.
Finally, this Part examines regulations aimed at requiring or
encouraging banks to provide transaction account services to low-income
consumers. In the federal arena, the Community Reinvestment Act might
encourage banks to provide progressive cross-subsidization of some
transaction accounts. Yet its weak enforcement mechanism suggests its
influence is likely limited.
In sum, while there are strong arguments that the transaction account
market is inefficient, it is difficult to argue that these inefficiencies
uniformly promote regressive cross-subsidization among transaction
accountholders.
i.

Market Entry Restraints

As an initial matter, for regulation to require or encourage crosssubsidization, there must be a mechanism that allows banks to overprice
some transaction accounts. If the market for transaction accounts was
competitive, overpricing of some transaction accounts would lead
competitors to offer the same service at a lower price. The overpaying
customers would then move to the less costly alternatives. Overpricing is
likely to occur only when consumers are limited in their options.113
There is reason to believe that regulatory barriers limit competition in
the transaction account market. Transaction accounts offered by banks are
particularly attractive to consumers because the accounts are insured by the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC).114 Non-banks cannot offer
FDIC-insured accounts.115 The FDIC and other bank regulators tightly

113. See supra notes 39, 44, and accompanying text.
114. Single-owner interest bearing transaction accounts are insured up to $250,000. 12
U.S.C. § 1821(a)(1)(E) (Supp. 2011). Most non-interest bearing transaction accounts are
currently fully insured. 12 C.F.R. § 330.16 (2012) (providing unlimited coverage through
December 31, 2012).
115. See 12 U.S.C. § 1815(a)(1) (Supp. 2011) (providing that “any depository institution
which is engaged in the business of receiving deposits . . . upon application to and
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control entry into the banking market.116 Capital requirements,117 activities
restrictions,118 and other regulations also pose significant barriers to entry
and expansion. Data show that a significant portion of deposits are held by
a relatively small number of banks. In 2011, the ten largest U.S. banks
held 44% of all domestic deposits.119 Large banks do tend to pay lower
interest rates on transaction accounts120 and charge higher fees121 than their
smaller competitors.122 Studies suggest that larger banks may “have gained
pricing power over deposit services in regional markets.”123 Regulations

examination by the [FDIC] and approval by the Board of Directors, may become an insured
depository institution”); Id. § 1813(c)(1) (2006) (defining a depository institution to include
only “bank[s] or savings association[s]”).
116. See generally RICHARD SCOTT CARNELL, JONATHAN R. MACEY & GEOFFREY P.
MILLER, THE LAW OF BANKING AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 73–76 (4th ed. 2009)
(describing the process for receiving regulatory approval to charter a bank). In recent years,
the FDIC has been particularly stingy with new (de novo) bank charters. See Barbara A.
Rehm, Editor at Large: FDIC Set to End De Novo Dry Spell, AM. BANKER, Dec. 2, 2010, at
1.
117. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. §§ 325.3, 325.103 (2012).
118. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1841–42 (Supp. 2011).
119. As of June 30, 2011, the ten largest banks as measured by total domestic deposits
were: Bank of America, National Association; Wells Fargo Bank, National Association;
JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Association; Citibank, National Association; U.S. Bank
National Association; PNC Bank, National Association; TD Bank, National Association;
SunTrust Bank; Branch Banking and Trust Company; and The Bank of New York Mellon.
They held $3.64 trillion of the $8.25 trillion domestic deposits. See Summary of Deposits
Data, FDIC, http://www2.fdic.gov/sod/ (follow “Summary Tables” hyperlink; then follow
“Top 50 Commercial Banks and Savings Institutions by Deposits” hyperlink; then select
June 30, 2011 in “Data as of” dropdown menu; then select “Run Report” hyperlink) (last
visited Nov. 20, 2012).
120. See Richard J. Rosen, Banking Market Conditions and Deposit Interest Rates, 31 J.
OF BANKING & FIN. 3862, 3864 (2007) (concluding that between 1998 and 2004, “markets
with a larger share of mega-banks [were] less competitive than markets with a larger share
of mid-size banks, all else equal”).
121. See GAO, BANK FEES REPORT, supra note 3, at 16 (“Large institutions—those with
more than $1 billion in assets—on average charged more for the majority of fees than
midsized or small institutions—those with assets of $100 million to $1 billion and less than
$100 million, respectively.”); BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., ANNUAL
REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON RETAIL FEES AND SERVICES OF DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS 8
(2003), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/rptcongress/2003fees.pdf
(finding that “[o]f the fourteen fees for which comparisons are available . . ., multistate
banks charged significantly higher fees in eight cases and in no case charged a significantly
lower fee”).
122. There are several possible explanations for the pricing differences between small
and large banks. See infra notes 274–78 and accompanying text.
123. Wilmarth, supra note 90, at 295; see also Maurice E. Stucke, Lessons From the
Financial Crisis, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 313, 335–36 (2010) (“[C]onsumers may be paying
supracompetitive overdraft fees to large financial institutions, which in turn distribute the
rents unequally (namely to the CEOs and other senior executives).”) (citation omitted).
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that limit the entry and expansion in banking could potentially result in a
market (or markets) where banks are able to charge supracompetitive prices
to transaction accountholders.
General market power in transaction accounts would only explain why
banks could overcharge all transaction accountholders. However, it may
well be that the regulatory restraints in the transaction account market
affect different transaction account services differently.
Non-bank
competition for transaction account-type services is partly determined by
the account type. For those consumers capable of maintaining a high
account balance, mutual funds are to some extent a competitive product to
bank transaction accounts.124 For those consumers who do not maintain a
high account balance, check cashing services, money orders, and prepaid
cards are to some extent competitive products for transaction accounts.125
If mutual funds are a more effective competitor than fringe financial
service providers, then regulatory restraints may allow banks to reap
supracompetitive profits from low-balance accounts, but not high-balance
accounts.
If, however, restraints on entry and expansion in the banking market
allow banks supracompetitive profits on all types of transaction accounts,
then other factors must influence banks’ decisions to engage in crosssubsidization.
ii.

Interest Rate Regulation

Regulation of the amount of interest banks can pay to transaction
accountholders could force or encourage banks to engage in crosssubsidization. Indeed, previous scholars have concluded that historic
interest rate restrictions led to cross-subsidization. Today, however, banks
are free to pay interest on transaction accounts. Thus, interest rate
regulation can no longer be claimed as a source of cross-subsidization.
During the Great Depression, Congress enacted a law prohibiting all
banks from paying interest on demand deposit accounts.126 Because of this
limitation, most consumers paid few transaction account fees.127 In the
124. See infra notes 126–138 and accompanying text (discussing how the development
of mutual funds led some bank customers to move their money from transaction accounts).
125. See infra notes 293–297 (discussing prepaid cards as a substitute for transaction
accounts) and notes 313–328 (discussing payday loans as a substitute for transaction
accounts).
126. Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, §10, 48 Stat. 162, 181 (1933). The law
also limited banks’ ability to pay interest on other types of deposits. Id.
127. In 1987, the General Accounting Office surveyed 1662 randomly selected banks
and thrifts about the current and historic terms of their checking accounts. U.S. GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-87-70, BANKING SERVICES: CHANGES IN FEES AND DEPOSIT
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1970s, however, the banking environment changed.128 As interest rates
rose, consumers became frustrated with the paltry rates of interest they
earned on bank deposits.129 Securities markets stepped up to fill the
demand for better returns by offering mutual funds.130 Rather than simply
watch their deposit bases disappear,131 banks lobbied Congress to remove
the interest rate caps that kept them from competing with mutual funds.
Congress responded by passing the Depository Institutions Deregulation
and Monetary Control Act.132 Among other things, this Act phased out
many of the restrictions on the amount of interest that banks could pay
depositors.133 In 1982, the Garn-St Germain Act accelerated the phase-outs
and allowed banks to offer insured money market deposit accounts without
interest rate restrictions.134 The result of interest rate deregulation was a
sudden jump in the interest rates banks paid for transaction accounts.
Banks that had been paying interest rates “of around 5 1/4% were suddenly
paying in excess of 15% to attract or merely maintain deposits.”135 Banks
ACCOUNT INTEREST RATES SINCE DEREGULATION 13 (1987), available at
http://www.legistorm.com/showFile/L2xzX3Njb3JlL2dhby9wZGYvMTk4Ny83/
ful15873.pdf [hereinafter GAO, CHANGES IN FEES AND DEPOSIT ACCOUNT INTEREST RATES].
The survey found that in 1977 “about 35 percent of banks offered a free noninterest-bearing
checking account. Another 59 percent carried no fees if a minimum balance was
maintained.” Id. at 22. At that time, some banks did not even charge fees for services like
printing checks, stopping payment on a check, or returning a check for insufficient funds.
Id. at 32–34.
128. CARNELL, MACEY & MILLER, supra note 116, at 24–25.
129. Id.
130. See id. “The mutual fund became the most important financial innovation and
money substitute by offering many of the deposit services of banks without imposing the
costs of reserve requirements and federal deposit insurance.” Timothy A. Canova, The
Transformation of U.S. Banking and Finance: From Regulated Competition to Free-Market
Receivership, 60 BROOK. L. REV. 1295, 1314 (1995).
131. See Laurie S. Goodman & Sherrill Shaffer, The Economics of Deposit Insurance: A
Critical Evaluation of Proposed Reforms, 2 YALE J. ON REG. 145, 152 (1984) (“[A]s interest
rates climbed in the late 1970’s, money market mutual funds, which had no interest rate
limitations, grew from $43 billion at the end of 1979 to $242 billion in November 1982.”)
(citation omitted).
132. Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L.
No. 96-221, tit. II, 94 Stat. 132, 142–45 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12
U.S.C.).
133. See id. § 204.
134. Garn-St Germain Depository Institutions Act, Pub. L. No. 97-320, §§ 326–27, 96
Stat. 1469, 1500–01 (1982) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 3503). The phase-outs were completed
by 1985. See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Expansion of State Bank Powers, the Federal
Response, and the Case for Preserving the Dual Banking System, 58 FORDHAM L. REV.
1133, 1143 (1990).
135. Alvin C. Harrell, Deposit Insurance Issues and the Implications for the Structure of
the American Financial System, 18 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 179, 188 (1993); see also Eric J.
Gouvin, Truth in Savings and the Failure of Legislative Methodology, 62 U. CIN. L. REV.
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also increasingly turned to transaction account fees to generate income.136
The adjustment in account pricing following interest rate deregulation
led many scholars to conclude that the interest rate regulation had
encouraged cross-subsidization among groups of transaction
accountholders.137 “The popular view was that the 20 percent of bank
customers with the largest deposit balances subsidized the 80 percent with
lower balances.”138
In an environment where banks could not pay interest on transaction
accounts, large depositors could be overcharged (by not receiving interest
for the use of their money) because there were few alternatives. Banks
sought to evade the effects of the interest rate regulation by offering
“implicit interest”—increased services to accountholders.139 Banks offered
accountholders “free bank-by-mail services, gifts ranging from teddy bears
to toasters, and convenient neighborhood branch offices.”140
This
competition through increased service was inefficient.141 Empirical studies
concluded that banks were not successful in fully compensating some highbalance accounts.142

1281, 1292 (1994) (“When the artificial regulatory constraints on the price of deposits
disappeared . . . deposit interest rates soared . . . .”).
136. Gouvin, supra note 135, at 1292 (“In light of the shrinking interest rate spread,
noninterest income, in the form of fees and charges, began to play an increasingly important
role in the finances of banks.”). See generally GAO, CHANGES IN FEES AND DEPOSIT
ACCOUNT INTEREST RATES, supra note 127 (reporting a survey of banks and thrifts regarding
bank account fees between 1977 and 1985).
137. See Shaffer, supra note 32 (reporting an empirical investigation concluding that in
an environment where interest rates were regulated, some transaction accounts subsidized
other transaction accounts).
138. KOCH & MACDONALD, supra note 69, at 403; see also PETER S. ROSE & SYLVIA C.
HUDGINS, BANK MANAGEMENT & FINANCIAL SERVICES 396–97 (7th ed. 2008) (describing
how interest rate regulation led to non-price competition for transaction accounts).
139. STEPHEN H. AXILROD ET AL., STAFF OF THE BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE
SYS., THE IMPACT OF THE PAYMENT OF INTEREST ON DEMAND DEPOSITS 1 (1977), available
at http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/docs/publications/books/ipidd_bog_19770131.pdf (“Bank
efforts to attract such deposits have mainly involved the payment of implicit interest in the
form of charges below cost for services performed.”); Richard Startz, Competition and
Interest Rate Ceilings in Commercial Banking, 98 Q. J. ECON. 255, 257 (1983) [hereinafter,
Startz, Competition and Interest Rate Ceilings] (“Price controls are evaded fully or in part as
agents substitute quality, advertising, or other forms of nonprice competition in place of
forbidden, open price competition.”); Richard Startz, Implicit Interest on Demand Deposits,
5 J. MONETARY ECON. 515, 515 (1979) (finding that this “rate of implicit interest appears to
be well below the competitive rate on deposits . . . [but] also well above zero”).
140. ROSE & HUDGINS, supra note 138, at 396.
141. See id. at 397 (noting the market distortion of service-based competition); KOCH &
MACDONALD, supra note 69, at 403 (discussing the cross-subsidization).
142. Startz, Competition and Interest Rate Ceilings in Commercial Banking, supra note
139, at 259 (“[S]tudies all tend to show that banks return to depositors between one third
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With the overpayment by high-balance accounts, banks could afford
to provide account services to unprofitable low-balance accounts.143 But
over-payment by high-balance accountholders would not necessarily have
flowed to low-balance accountholders. A bank seeking to maximize
shareholder value would have preferred to retain the overpayments as
monopolistic profits.144 Nevertheless, in an environment where interest was
prohibited, banks may have found it administratively difficult to
simultaneously discourage small deposits and encourage large deposits.145
Thus, high-balance accounts cross-subsidized low-balance accounts while
interest was prohibited.
It seems reasonable to postulate that the cross-subsidization caused by
the prohibition on interest was progressive—meaning that it benefitted lowincome consumers (and perhaps even middle-income consumers) at the
expense of high-income consumers. Of course, not all low-balance
accounts were held by low-income consumers. For example, some
relatively wealthy depositors may have maintained second or third accounts
with low balances for special purposes.146 At the same time, “large
depositors [may have been] more sensitive to the costs of holding idle
demand deposits” and aggressively sought alternatives.147 Yet overall, it is
reasonable to theorize that under interest rate regulation, wealthy depositors
cross-subsidized low-income consumers.148
and two thirds of the yield from investing deposit funds.”).
143. See CASKEY, supra note 29, at 88 (“The low competitive pressures in this
[regulated] environment enabled banks to offer many services on which they lost money,
making it up by paying below-market interest rates on large deposits. Among the moneylosing services most banks offered was to permit depositors to maintain checking accounts
with very small balances and low fees or no fees.”).
144. See William P. Kratzke, Tax Subsidies, Third-Party-Payments, and CrossSubsidization: America’s Distorted Health Care Markets, 40 U. MEM. L. REV. 279, 352
(2009) (“Some providers are able to maintain a clientele that pays the rates necessary for
cross-subsidization but, in fact, simply keep supracompetitive profits for themselves.”).
145. Cf. AXILROD ET AL., supra note 139, at 2 (stating that if banks were allowed to offer
interest on transaction accounts “banks would be motivated to gauge more carefully their
costs of demand deposit services”).
146. See Glenn B. Canner & Ellen Maland, Basic Banking, 73 FED. RESERVE BULL. 255,
255 (1987) (noting that some low-balance accounts were secondary, less-used accounts that
the accountholder maintained simply because of the low cost).
147. AXILROD ET AL., supra note 139, at 25.
148. See Edward L. Rubin, The Lifetime Banking Controversy: Putting Deregulation to
Work for the Low-Income Consumer, 67 IND. L.J. 213, 215 (1992) (noting that deregulation
“worked to the disadvantage of low-income consumers [because] these consumers tended to
have small account balances”). Elimination of the cross-subsidy likely led some consumers
with small-balances to close their accounts. See CASKEY, supra note 29, at 90
(“Undoubtedly, in response to fee increases, some consumers with small bank accounts
decided that it was no longer worthwhile to maintain bank accounts.”); GAO, CHANGES IN
FEES AND DEPOSIT ACCOUNT INTEREST RATES, supra note 127, at 3 (noting that although
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Any cross-subsidization that existed prior to the 1980s was reduced
when mutual funds began to offer a viable alternative to transaction
accounts and Congress began to allow banks to pay interest on transaction
accounts.149
However, the deregulation was limited.
Regulations
continued to prohibit banks from paying interest on corporate demand
deposit accounts.150 It is possible that this narrower restriction, like the
broader interest rate regulation before it, led to some cross-subsidization.
As before, banks and corporate transaction accountholders attempted to
minimize any cross-subsidization by employing transaction account
alternatives to evade the interest rate regulation. For example, some
corporations simply elected to keep funds that would otherwise have been
deposited in bank transaction accounts in non-bank mutual funds.151 Banks
offered corporate accountholders “earnings credits” that could be used to
offset bank fees.152 In addition, banks offered services to business
customers that allowed them to temporarily sweep funds between
transaction accounts and other accounts not covered by interest rate
restrictions.153 Notwithstanding these alternatives, it is possible that the
corporate account interest rate regulation, like the broader interest rate
regulation before the 1980s, resulted in banks’ overpricing some corporate
transaction accounts.154
“various efforts [had] been made to provide low cost alternatives [to bank accounts] for
certain consumers, these services [were] not available to all”).
149. See KOCH & MACDONALD, supra note 69, at 403 (“Deregulation removed [the]
subsidy [for low-balance accounts] and induced banks to modify their pricing policies.”).
150. 12 U.S.C. § 371a (2009) (repealed by Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 11-203, § 627(a)(1), 124 Stat. 1640).
151. See Sarah Johnson, Any Interest in Interest?, CFO MAG., July 21, 2011, at 2
(reporting survey results finding that companies keep 19% of their short-term investments in
money-market mutual funds).
152. See Chris Moon, New Rules on Corporate Checking Accounts a ‘Non-Event’—For
Now, WICHITA BUS. J., Aug. 5, 2011, available at 2011 WLNR 15561315.
153. See Financial Institutions Advisory & Financial Regulatory Client Publication,
Shearman & Sterling LLP, Dodd-Frank: Regulation Q Goes the Way of the Model T 2 (July
15, 2011), available at http://www.shearman.com/files/Publication/308b6f96-4aef-45f48177-a14e9defef2b/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/bee9d518-a03d-4643-8f5725e566030422/FIA-071511-regulation_q_model_t.pdf (explaining that banks would sweep
funds from corporate transaction accounts to interest-bearing offshore accounts and enter
repurchase agreements with corporate transaction accountholders allowing them to hold
U.S. government securities overnight).
154. One commentator has noted that “[t]he earnings credit interest rate is typically less
than that offered by a ‘hard’ investment-earning vehicle and any unused earning credits
typically do not carry forward from month to month. ” Dan Gill, Repeal of Regulation Q to
Impact Banking Relationships, 31 ENTERPRISE 1, 6 (Dec. 31, 2001). If true, this suggests
that business accountholders may not have been effective in avoiding overpayment. Other
commentary suggests that the implicit interest on commercial accounts was more effective.
See Prohibition Against Payment of Interest on Demand Deposits, 76 Fed. Reg. 42,015,
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It is difficult to determine who benefitted from any overpricing of
corporate transaction accounts. Some suggest that banks kept the fruits of
overpricing as profits.155 This explanation is bolstered by the lobbying
efforts many banks employed in an attempt to preserve the regulation.156
Others suggest that the removal of the restriction will simply lead to more
consumer account fees.157 This prediction could be rooted in a belief that
the interest-free commercial transaction accounts were cross-subsidizing
consumer accounts.
At any rate, the Dodd-Frank Act repealed the restriction on paying
interest on corporate demand deposit accounts.158 Banks are now free to
offer competitive interest rates on all transaction accounts.159 Thus, direct
interest rate regulation should no longer be a source of cross-subsidization
in transaction account pricing.

42,016 (July 18, 2011) (noting that one bank supporting the repeal of the interest restriction
argued that it “‘has been pretty much hollowed out and therefore rendered irrelevant through
the years.’”) (quoting an anonymous bank); Johnson, supra note 151, at 2 (“What [business
accountholders are] making now from checking accounts through earnings credits (soft
dollars used to offset banking fees) is currently higher than money market fund rates . . . .”).
155. See John Hamby, Viewpoint, Repeal of Reg Q a Great Opportunity, AM. BANKER,
Oct. 7, 2010, at 8 (“Many [banks] saw business checking accounts as merely ‘cost-free’
funds. Although most have some type of program for earnings credits to offset fees, they
tend to favor minimal rates and a limited array of services, hoping that excess funds will be
left in the bank without compensation.”); Tamarind Phinisee, Dodd-Frank Creating
Regulatory Burden for Community Banks, SAN ANTONIO BUS. J., July 29, 2011, available at
2011 WLNR 15048338 (“Under Reg Q, banks, in essence, kept the interest earned on the
money in these accounts as part of their profit margins.”).
156. See Kari Taylor, Growing Interest in Interest, BANK NEWS, July 1, 2011, at 50
(reporting that the Independent Community Bankers of America and the Independent
Bankers Association of Texas opposed the move to lift the interest rate restriction).
157. See Letter from Christopher Cole, Senior Vice President & Reg’l Counsel, Indep.
Cmty. Bankers of Am. to Jennifer J. Johnson, Sec’y, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve
Sys. & Robert E. Feldman, Exec. Sec’y, FDIC (May 13, 2011), available at
http://www.icba.org/files/ICBASites/PDFs/cl051311.pdf (stating that when banks can pay
interest on business transaction accounts “[c]onsumers . . . will see new charges for bank
services as banks seek to cover their increased funding costs”).
158. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No.
11-203, § 627(a)(1), 124 Stat. 1640; Prohibition Against Payment of Interest on Demand
Deposits, 78 Fed. Reg. at 42,015–20. Since the repeal, there have been few pricing
adjustments. See, e.g., Moon, supra note 152. It is difficult to know whether this should be
attributed to the lack of a subsidy under the interest rate regulation or to the prevailing low
interest rates at the time of the change. See Robert Barba, Bankers Split on Impact of Reg.
Q Move, AM. BANKER, Mar. 18, 2011, at 1 (quoting a banker who believes that “‘[i]n this
rate environment, [repeal of the interest rate restriction] doesn’t have an immediate effect
because of how low rates are’”).
159. Perhaps the only remaining significant restriction is that undercapitalized banks
cannot solicit deposits “by offering rates of interest that are significantly higher than the
prevailing rates of interest on insured deposits.” 12 U.S.C. § 1831f(h) (Supp. 2011).
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iii. Fee Regulation
As policymakers relaxed the regulation of interest on transaction
accounts, they simultaneously increased their scrutiny of bank fees. Like
interest rate regulations, fee regulations can potentially lead to crosssubsidization. Due in part to contradictory attitudes about banks’ fees,
regulations provide conflicting incentives for banks regarding account
pricing. Some regulations encourage pricing structures with high overdraft
charges and other penalty-type fees, while other regulations discourage
overdrafts on debit card transactions. This conflict, and the fact that fee
regulations are largely aimed at disclosure, suggests that fee regulations
themselves have had only a limited impact on transaction account pricing.
When interest rates were capped, neither the federal nor the state
governments were particularly interested in regulating banks’ fee
income.160 For this reason Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) Article 4,
which was originally completed in 1952161 and generally governs checking
accounts, does not directly address fees.162 As currently drafted, the U.C.C.
requires that banks act in “good faith” when dealing with account
holders.163 However, “good faith” is narrowly defined and requires only
“honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of
fair dealing.”164 This good faith standard gives banks wide discretion to
charge transaction account fees.165
States have also enacted laws that prohibit unfair or deceptive acts or
practices.166 For example, in Texas, the Deceptive Trade Practices Act
160. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
161. The U.C.C. was drafted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws and then enacted by state legislatures throughout the country. See STEPHEN C.
VELTRI, THE ABCS OF THE UCC, ARTICLE: 3 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS, ARTICLE 4: BANK
DEPOSITS 4-5 (2d ed. 2004); Fairfax Leary, Jr. & Marc G. Tarlow, Reflections on Articles 3
and 4 for a Review Committee, 48 TEMP. L.Q. 919, 919 n.1 (1975).
162. See Gail K. Hillebrand, Revised Articles 3 and 4 of the Uniform Commercial Code:
A Consumer Perspective, 42 ALA. L. REV. 679, 713 (1991) (“When the [U.C.C.] was first
drafted and promulgated, the issue of ancillary fees was less pressing than it is today. It was
not until the 1980s that banks began to look to multiple fees on individual accounts as a
significant revenue source.”); see also U.C.C. § 4-401 cmt. 3 (2011) (“This Act does not
regulate fees that banks charge their customers for a notice of postdating or other services
covered by the Act . . . .”).
163. U.C.C. § 1-304 (2011) (“Every contract or duty within [the Uniform Commercial
Code] imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance and enforcement.”).
164. Id. § 1-201(b)(20).
165. Cf. Hillebrand, supra note 162, at 695 (“A good faith standard is not an adequate
substitute for more specific consumer protections, because a good faith standard can be
enforced only through cumbersome and expensive fact-based litigation.”).
166. Jeff Sovern, Private Actions Under the Deceptive Trade Practices Acts:
Reconsidering the FTC Act as Rule Model, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 437, 446 (1991) (“[S]tate
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protects consumers from “false, misleading, and deceptive business
practices.”167 Although these Acts generally protect only “consumers” of
“goods and services,”168 courts have held that a depositor is a “consumer”
of “banking services.”169 Most states grant aggrieved customers the right to
sue for damages from violations of the statute.170
As banks began to charge fees, customers upset with those fees
brought suits against banks using the ill-suited U.C.C., deceptive trade
practices acts, and other common law tools.171 Because these types of suits
were largely ineffective,172 it is unlikely that these laws have had much
impact on banks’ pricing of transaction accounts.
As account fees became more widespread, the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) began to worry that state fee regulation
could hurt the national banks that it supervised.173 Some states began
hinting that further fee regulation could be forthcoming. 174 To prevent

legislatures, beginning in the late 1950s, began enacting statutes designed to prohibit
deceptive and, in some states, unfair practices. By 1981, every state in the country had
enacted such a statute.”) (citations omitted).
167. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.44(a) (West 2011).
168. Id. § 17.45.
169. Bank One, Tex., N.A. v. Taylor, 970 F.2d 16, 28 n.12 (5th Cir. 1992); see generally
RICHARD M. ALDERMAN, THE LAWYER’S GUIDE TO THE TEXAS DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES
ACT § 2.033[B] (2010).
170. Sovern, supra note 166, at 448.
171. See, e.g., Saunders v. Mich. Ave. Nat’l Bank, 662 N.E.2d 602, 607–11 (Ill. App. Ct.
1996) (holding that a bank’s overdraft fee did not amount to a deceptive practice, did not
violate the bank’s duty of good faith, and was not unconscionable); Daniels v. PNC Bank,
N.A., 738 N.E.2d 447 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000) (holding that a bank did not violate its duty of
good faith by sorting checks in a manner that maximized the overdraft fees charged to
customers); Wallace v. Nat’l Bank of Comm., 938 S.W.2d 684 (Tenn. 1996) (holding that a
bank did not violate the duty of good faith by charging insufficient funds and return check
fees even when those fees were increased after the account agreement was signed).
172. In two cases, courts determined that the plaintiff had presented issues of fact that
could be presented to a jury. See Perdue v. Crocker Nat’l Bank, 702 P.2d 503 (Cal. 1985)
(reversing the trial court’s dismissal of a claim that a $6 overdraft charge was
unconscionable); Best v. U.S. Nat’l Bank of Or., 739 P.2d 554 (Or. 1987) (holding that
issues of fact existed as to whether the bank had acted in good faith when setting fees).
Both cases eventually settled. See James J. White, NSF Fees, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 185, 188
(2007). Other plaintiffs were not so successful. See White, supra, at 192 (stating that
“Perdue and Best were the high-water mark” for cases challenging bank fees and noting that
“there are no reported opinions to document any plaintiff victories after 1987”).
173. See Interpretive Ruling Concerning National Bank Service Charges, 48 Fed. Reg.
54,319, 54,319 (Dec. 2, 1983) (citing “litigation . . . over deposit account service charges”
as a motivating factor behind new preemption rules).
174. Vermont, for example, began conducting a quarterly survey of bank fees. VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 8, §§ 10,501–04 (2011). In addition, New York and New Jersey adopted laws
requiring banks to offer basic transaction accounts with low monthly fees, but did not cap
fees on regular bank accounts. See infra Part III.B.3 (discussing basic bank accounts in
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states from regulating fees charged by national banks, the OCC
promulgated a rule authorizing national banks to charge transaction account
fees.175 The rule further explained that any state regulation of fees was
preempted by federal law, including the OCC’s own regulation regarding
fees.176 Preemption freed nationally chartered banks, including nearly all of
the large banks, from state fee regulation laws.177 Nationally chartered
banks need only follow the federal law including the OCC regulations.
OCC regulations give national banks the authority to charge
transaction account fees.178 The regulations state that “[t]he establishment
of non-interest charges and fees, their amounts, and the method of
calculating them are business decisions to be made by each bank, in its
discretion, according to sound banking judgment and safe and sound
banking principles.”179 A fee is “in accordance with safe and sound
banking principles if the bank employs a decision-making process through
which it considers” specifically identified factors including “[t]he cost
incurred by the bank in providing the service.”180 While national banks are
greater detail).
175. See 12 C.F.R. § 7.8000(b) (1984) (“Establishment of deposit account service
charges, and the amounts thereof, is a business decision made by each bank and the [OCC]
will not substitute its judgment.”).
176. See id. § 7.8000(c) (“A national bank may establish any deposit account service
charge . . . notwithstanding any state laws which prohibit the charge assessed or limit or
restrict the amount of that charge. Those laws impair the efficiency of national banks and
conflict with the regulatory scheme governing the national banking system and are
preempted by federal law.”).
177. Over the years, the OCC softened the preemption language in its regulations.
White, supra note 172, at 197. More recently, the Dodd-Frank Act adopted new preemption
standards for state law consumer protection measures. See 12 U.S.C. § 25b(b) (Supp. 2011)
(stating that “consumer financial laws are preempted” if they “prevent[] or significantly
interfere[] with the exercise by the national bank of its powers”). The OCC regulation now
provides that “[t]he OCC applies preemption principles derived from the United States
Constitution, as interpreted through judicial precedent, when determining whether State
laws apply that purport to limit or prohibit charges and fees.” 12 C.F.R. § 7.4002(d) (2012).
Under Dodd-Frank’s new preemption standards, state laws that require national banks to
provide transaction account services at prices lower than their marginal cost may still be
preempted. Courts might reasonably conclude that a state law requiring below-cost service
conflicts with the federal law’s interest in maintaining a safe and sound banking system.
See Office of Thrift Supervision Integration, 76 Fed. Reg. 43,549, 43,556 (July 21, 2011)
(explaining that the OCC fee regulation could still preempt state law following DoddFrank); Baptista v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 640 F.3d 1194 (11th Cir. 2011) (holding
that a state law regulating bank check cashing fees was preempted by OCC regulation after
Dodd-Frank).
178. 12 C.F.R. § 7.4002(a).
179. Id. § 7.4002(b)(2); see also GAO, BANK FEES REPORT, supra note 3, at 25–28
(noting that as long as fees are properly disclosed, regulators will only interfere with a
bank’s fee structure if that structure poses a safety and soundness concern).
180. 12 C.F.R. § 7.4002(b)(2)(i).
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to consider the cost of providing transaction account services in setting the
fees, the regulation does not prohibit fees that exceed the cost of providing
the service.181 A bank must also consider: “[t]he deterrence of misuse by
customers of banking services; [t]he enhancement of the competitive
position of the bank in accordance with the bank’s business plan and
marketing strategy; and [t]he maintenance of the safety and soundness of
the institution.”182
The OCC regulations (and similar state regulations183) do not on their
face require cross-subsidization in transaction account pricing. They do not
require banks to charge any group less than the incremental cost of
providing the service. Nor do the regulations require that banks charge any
group of consumers more than the stand-alone cost of providing service to
that group. Indeed, by emphasizing the need to consider the cost of
providing the service, the regulations may discourage cross-subsidization.
The regulations may, however, impact how banks structure their fees.
In particular, the regulations suggest that banks should adopt pricing
structures that deter customers from misusing banking services.184 The
OCC explained that this provision was intended to allow banks to charge
relatively high fees for overdrafts and returned checks.185 Writing bad
checks was (and still is) a tactic of thieves and con-artists.186 Bad checks
often lead to losses for the banks involved in processing the check as well
as for others who accepted the check before depositing it.187 While the
OCC was interested in preventing these losses, it may also have been
motivated by a concern that a large volume of bad checks would undermine
the credibility of banks or checks in general.188 In any event, the OCC saw
181. See Video Trax, Inc. v. NationsBank, N.A., 33 F. Supp. 2d 1041, 1051 (S.D. Fla.
1998) (holding that it was reasonable for a bank to consider profit margin in setting fees).
182. 12 C.F.R. § 7.4002(b)(2)(ii)-(iv).
183. Some states have adopted fee laws substantially similar to the OCC regulation. See,
e.g., 205 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5e(b) (2011); MINN. STAT. § 48.512(7) (2011).
184. See 12 C.F.R. § 7.4002(b)(2)(ii).
185. See Interpretive Ruling Concerning National Bank Service Charges, 48 Fed. Reg.
54,319, 54,319 (Dec. 2, 1983) (opining that overdraft fees should be high enough to
“discourage customers from frequently writing checks in amounts greater than their account
balances”).
186. See Julie Andersen Hill, Cashier’s Check Scam Targets Attorneys, 14 J. CONSUMER
& COM. L. 54 (2011) (discussing frauds perpetrated by check); White, supra note 172, at
185 (“In the early days, giving someone a bad check was so morally reprehensible that it
sometimes landed one in jail.”).
187. See supra notes 73–77 and accompanying text.
188. See Wallace v. Bank of Bartlett, 55 F.3d 1166, 1169 n.4 (6th Cir. 1995) (quoting a
bank’s claim that “overdrafts are detrimental to the banking system because at some level
they will cause a loss of confidence in checks as a medium of payment.”); White, supra note
172, at 185 (“A bounced check might even draw a reproach from the banker on whose bank
the check was drawn for fear that the checks from that bank would get a bad name.”).
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penalty-type fees as a way to discourage bad behavior.
It is unclear what role OCC regulations play in banks’ transaction
account pricing. Some banks do cite deterrence as a reason for high
overdraft charges. For example, the website of ACNB Bank in Gettysburg,
Pennsylvania explains that its overdraft fee is “like a ticket or a fine you
pay for speeding.”189 In addition, banks in litigation and administrative
proceedings justify overdraft fees citing their desire to deter overdrafts.190
It is possible that the OCC’s fee regulations encourage some banks to adopt
higher overdraft and insufficient funds fees than they otherwise would.
Similarly, laws aimed at improving the transparency of transaction
account pricing might encourage banks to adopt penalty-type fees instead
of monthly fees. Under the Truth in Savings Act and accompanying
regulations, banks may advertise a transaction account as “free” or “nocost” only if it does not have a minimum balance, does not have a limit on
the number of transactions, and does not charge “any regular service or
transaction fee.”191 In other words, an account can be marketed as “free”
even if it has large overdraft, insufficient funds, and other penalty fees.192
The apparent rationale behind this regulatory approach was that, unlike
overdraft fees and other penalty fees, customers could not readily avoid
regular service fees.193
The Truth in Savings Act likely encourages banks to use fees that will

189. ACNB Bank, Frequently Asked Questions About Overdraft Services,
http://www.acnb.com/home/fiFiles/static/documents/Opt_In_Project_FAQs_final_101311.p
df (last visited Nov. 20, 2012). Although the regulation was aimed at checks, ACNB’s
literature does not distinguish between check overdrafts and debit overdrafts when it offers
the deterrence justification. Id. ACNB Bank also cites the risk of loss on unpaid overdrafts
as a justification for the fee. Id.
190. See, e.g., Wallace, 55 F.3d at 1169 n.4; OCC, Interpretive Letter No. 1082 (May 17,
2007), available at http://www.occ.gov/static/interpretations-and-precedents/jun07/int
1082.pdf.
191. 12 U.S.C. § 4302(d) (2011); see also 12 C.F.R. § 230.8 (2012) (listing fees that may
not be applied to “free” accounts); FDIC, Advertisement for “No Fee” Checking Account
Violates Truth in Savings Act if Fee is Imposed When Minimum Balance is Not
Maintained, Interpretive Letter 95-31 (Nov. 21, 1995) (stating that a bank could not use an
advertisement that used the words “no fee” followed by an asterisk explaining the minimum
balance requirement).
192. See STEPHEN G. CECCHETTI, MONEY, BANKING, & FINANCIAL MARKETS 495 (2d ed.
2008) (claiming that “bankers joke that ‘free checking’ really means ‘fee checking’ because
of all the fees customers end up paying.”). Under current regulations, banks must disclose
all fees, including overdraft fees. See Truth in Savings (Regulation DD), 12 C.F.R. §§
1030.1-.11 (2012).
193. Regulators may be rethinking this historic rationale for the advertising rule. See
Office of Thrift Supervision, Order to Cease and Desist, Woodforest Bank, Order No. WN10-16 (Apr. 23, 2010) (suggesting that a transaction account should not be marketed as
“free” if it charges high overdraft fees).
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preserve the “free” status of their accounts—including large overdraft fees.
For example, PNC Bank advertises a “free” checking account with no
monthly service charge or minimum balance. However, the account also
comes with overdraft charges of
-

$25 per item for the first occurrences in current and previous
eleven service charge cycles (limit of 4 charges per day)

-

$36 per item for additional occurrences within the same period
(limit of 4 charges per day) . . .

-

[, and a continuous overdraft charge of] $7 assessed each day your
account remains overdrawn for a period of five (5) or more
consecutive calendar days.194

Of course, high overdraft fees alone, even if adopted due to regulatory
pressure, do not necessarily provide evidence that some consumers overpay
for transaction accounts. In a competitive market, customers faced with
excessively high prices would simply take their business elsewhere. There
are, however, at least two possible scenarios in which some customers
might pay excessive overdraft fees. First, if accountholders who incur high
overdraft fees have few alternatives, those accountholders could end up
paying more than the stand-alone cost of providing transaction services to
those accounts.195 Second, consumers might suffer from cognitive biases
that lead them to select accounts with suboptimal pricing.196 Behavioral
research shows that not all consumers faced with high overdraft charges
will behave rationally.197
Some consumers may systematically
underestimate the likelihood that they will incur overdraft fees and discount
fees that they will pay in the future.198 In a competitive environment, banks
194. Consumer Schedule of Service Charges and Fees, PNC BANK,
https://content.pncmc.com/live/pnc/personal/serviceCharges/PA_Pittsburgh_ServiceCharges
.pdf (last visited Nov. 21, 2012).
195. See supra Part III.B.1 (discussing the possibility that market entry restraints might
prevent meaningful competition in transaction account pricing).
196. See Jennifer Martin, Debit Card Overdraft Services: Will the Federal Reserve’s
New Rules Enhance Transparency and Consumer Choice?, 29 BANKING & FIN. SERVICES
POL’Y REP. 1, 4 (2010) (“Effective private ordering of overdraft fees for debit card
transactions is limited due to the disclosure issues and adhesive nature of account
terms . . . .”).
197. According to the Federal Reserve, “[b]ehavioral research suggests that consumers
may choose the ‘free’ . . . account [with overdraft charges], even though the costs for
overdrawing the account could end up being substantially higher than the monthly
maintenance fee, because they may optimistically assume they will not overdraw the
account and as a result, incur overdraft fees.” Electronic Fund Transfers, 74 Fed. Reg.
59,033, 59,044 (Nov. 17, 2009)).
198. See Alces & Hopkins, supra note 23, at 890–91 (describing the difficulty some
consumers face in understanding account terms); Jeff Sovern, Toward a New Model of
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without high overdraft charges might attempt to educate customers about
their more favorable account pricing.199 But any gains from this
educational effort could be easily lost if other banks change their pricing
structures to match. This may encourage banks to persistently offer pricing
that involves high overdraft charges.200
While all consumers are likely impacted by some cognitive biases,201
unsophisticated consumers of limited means may be more prone to overpay
for transaction account services. As Professor Gregory Mitchell explains:
“[R]esearch tells us that cognitive biases do not affect us all with uncanny
consistency. In particular, differences in education, training, cognitive
capacity, thinking dispositions, sex, and cultural background across
individuals appear to be reliably associated with different levels of
cognitive performance.”202 Perhaps this partially explains why, according
to an FDIC study, only about 25% of transaction accountholders incur
overdraft fees in any given year.203 As illustrated by the following table,
consumers who lived in lower-income census tracts were more likely to
incur overdrafts.

Consumer Protection: The Problem of Inflated Transaction Costs, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1635, 1663 (2006) (stating that overpricing may occur when consumers “overlook or
underestimate” transaction costs).
199. Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 17–
18 (2008).
200. Id.
201. See Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis of Law, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1183
(1997) (stating that “people in most social categories” exhibit the cognitive bias of overoptimism) (citing Shelly E. Taylor, Positive Illusions: Creative Self-Deception and the
Healthy Mind 33 (1990)).
202. Gregory Mitchell, Why Law and Economics’ Perfect Rationality Should Not Be
Traded for Behavioral Law and Economics’ Equal Incompetence, 91 GEO. L.J. 67, 87
(2002).
203. FDIC, OVERDRAFT STUDY, supra note 77, at 76. The FDIC study gathered one year
worth of account-level data for overdrafts incurred by customers at a nonrandom sample of
thirty-nine banks between January 2005 and September 2008. Id. at 3–4. These data were
matched with census data regarding the average income of the area in which each
accountholder lived. Id. at 72. While this methodology does not actually establish the
income of the consumers incurring overdrafts, it is the best evidence available on this
question to date.
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CUSTOMER ACCOUNTS BY NUMBER OF OVERDRAFT
TRANSACTIONS PER YEAR AND INCOME GROUP FOR SURVEYED
BANKS WITH AUTOMATED OVERDRAFT PROGRAMS204
PERCENTAGE OF ROW TOTAL BY NUMBER OF TRANSACTIONS205
CENSUS TRACT
ALL ZERO 1–4 5–9 10–19 20+
INCOME BRACKET
Low income
100 61.9
16.7 7.6
6.3
7.5
Moderate income

100

68.4

13.9

6.2

5.1

6.4

Middle income

100

74.3

11.8

5.0

4.0

4.9

Upper income

100

78.2

10.5

4.2

3.3

3.8

Income not classified

100

74.6

12.2

6.0

3.6

3.6

No tract

100

74.2

12.6

5.1

3.9

4.3

All income classes

100

74.3

11.9

5.0

4.0

4.9

Similarly, a telephone survey of consumers conducted by the Center for
Responsible Lending found that consumers who incurred two or more
overdrafts in six months were more likely to be low-income, single, and
non-white.206 If low-income customers’ cognitive biases lead them to
inefficiently select transaction accounts with high overdraft fees or incur an
inefficiently high number of overdrafts, it is possible that these customers
will end up paying more than the stand-alone cost of transaction account
services.
Not all scholars, however, believe that cognitive biases systematically
lead low-income consumers to disproportionately overpay for transaction
accounts. A Moebs $ervices study of over one million account users at
both banks and credit unions found that only the accountholder’s credit
204. Id. at 76.
205. “Excludes business accounts, savings accounts, other than checkable accounts, new
accounts, and customers with more than 10 accounts.” Id. at 76 tbl. IX-11.
206. See LISA JAMES & PETER SMITH, CENTER FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, OVERDRAFT
LOANS: SURVEY FINDS GROWING PROBLEMS FOR CONSUMERS 3 (2006), available at
http://www.responsiblelending.org/overdraft-loans/research-analysis/ip013Overdraft_Survey-0406.pdf (“The average repeat [overdraft] user is 35-39 years old and has
a household income of $30,000 to $35,000, and only 61 percent of repeat users own their
own homes. Additionally, repeat overdraft loan users are more likely to be unmarried and
to be non-white.”). But see GAO, BANK FEES REPORT, supra note 3, at 24 (“[The Center for
Responsible Lending Study] had limitations, including the inherent difficulty in contacting
and obtaining cooperation from a representative sample of U.S. households with a telephone
survey and because it relied on consumers’ recall of and willingness to accurately report
past events rather than on actual reviews of their transactions.”).
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score had a “high degree of correlation” with the accountholder’s likeliness
to overdraft the account.207 “Gender, age, occupation, income, and wealth
were found not to correlate to overdraft behavior.”208 In addition, Professor
Marc Anthony Fusaro studied transaction account overdrafts at a small
Midwestern bank and similarly found that “no discernable patterns
emerged from these data indicating that people of all income levels
overdraft equally often.”209
Professor Todd Zywicki offers two potential explanations as to why it
is difficult to find a correlation between low-income and high overdrafts.
First, the majority of consumers who incur overdrafts are not “poor”
because “[b]y definition, overdraft borrowers have a bank account, which
distinguishes them from many unbanked consumers and suggests that they
have higher and more stable income than users of alternative financial
products such as payday lending and pawnshops.”210 Second, “access to
overdraft protection is commonly linked to direct deposit of payroll checks,
suggesting that many overdraft customers are also steadily employed” and
not poor.211
While the jury may still be out as to whether cognitive biases impact
the poor more than the rich, regulators have recently started to embrace the
theory of cognitive biases as a justification for new regulation. As a result,
regulators’ recent forays into transaction account supervision focus on
consumer education and discourage overdraft and other penalty-type fees.
For example, under Federal Reserve rules finalized in 2009, a consumer
must give affirmative permission for his or her bank to pay debit card
transactions that would result in an overdraft.212 Banks can continue to
charge overdraft fees for debit card transactions, so long as the customer
has given permission for debit card overdrafts.213 If a customer elects not
to opt for debit overdraft service, the bank must still offer the customer an
207. Press Release, Moebs $ervices, Who Uses Overdrafts? (Sept. 29, 2009), available
at http://www.moebs.com/PressReleases/tabid/58/ctl/Details/mid/380/ItemID/194/Default.a
spx.
208. Id.
209. Marc Anthony Fusaro, Hidden Consumer Loans: An Analysis of Implicit Interest
Rates on Bounced Checks, 29 J. OF FAM. & ECON. ISS. 251, 257 (2008).
210. Todd J. Zywicki, The Economics and Regulation of Bank Overdraft Protection, 69
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1141, 1165 (2012).
211. Id.
212. Electronic Fund Transfers, 74 Fed. Reg. 59,033, 59,052–54 (Nov. 17, 2009)
(codified at 12 C.F.R. §§ 205.12, 205.17). For a more fulsome discussion of the
requirements for charging debit overdraft fees, see Peter J. Wilder, The Brave New World of
Regulated Overdraft Fees: How Can Banks Prepare?, 127 BANKING L.J. 158 (2010).
213. 12 C.F.R. § 205.17(b) (2012). A bank may not condition its payment of overdrafts
for checks on a customer’s decision with respect to debit card overdrafts. Id. §
201.17(b)(2).
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account with the same features as accounts offered to those who opt in to
debit overdraft service.214 Consumers can enforce the opt-in provision and
collect damages for unauthorized charges.215 Sources estimate that as a
result of the new regulations, bank overdraft revenue fell by $3.6 billion in
2011,216 as early estimates showed that only roughly one-third of customers
elected to retain their overdraft coverage.217
While banks are still able to assess overdraft charges on debit card
transactions, this increased disclosure is aimed at discouraging banks from
charging debit card overdraft fees.
Indeed, the Federal Reserve
acknowledged that the regulation could lead banks to adjust their
transaction account pricing structures by adopting more monthly
maintenance fees.218 This move hints that regulators would prefer that
banks charge monthly maintenance fees rather than large overdraft fees—at
214. See id. § 205.17(b)(3). This provision was “not intended to interfere with state
basic banking laws or other limited-feature bank accounts marketed to consumers who have
historically had difficulty entering or remaining in the banking system.” Electronic Fund
Transfers, 74 Fed. Reg. at 59,045. The opt-in rule “does not prohibit institutions from
offering deposit account products with limited features, provided that the consumer is not
required to open such an account because the consumer did not opt in.” Id. For a discussion
of basic bank account initiatives see infra notes 237–250 and accompanying text.
215. 15 U.S.C. § 1693m(a) (Supp. 2011).
216. Victoria Finkle, Overdraft Rev Fell $3.6B in 2011, AM. BANKER Jan. 27, 2012, at
10.
217. Kyle Mills & Timothy J. Yeager, New Opt-In Overdraft Rules Cost Arkansas
Banks $39 Million Annually 1-4 (2012), available at http://waltoncollege.uark.edu/faculty/
papers/FINN/Costs_Opt_Overdraft_Regulation.pdf (finding an opt-in rate of 31% at surveyresponding Arkansas banks); CENTER FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, BANK COLLECTS
OVERDRAFT OPT-INS THROUGH MISLEADING MARKETING 2 (Apr. 2011), available at
http://www.responsiblelending.org/overdraft-loans/policy-legislation/regulators/CRL-OD
-Survey-Brief-final-2-4-25-11.pdf (finding that “33 percent of accountholders opted-in to
overdraft coverage”). These early estimates may be low. A later survey found that 77% of
consumers at surveyed community banks opted for debit card overdraft coverage. See
Community Banks Explore New Areas of Business to Raise Revenue, ABA BANK
MARKETING, Jan. 1, 2012, at 3 (reporting on a survey conducted by HEIT, a company that
provides bank compliance services).
218. See Electronic Fund Transfers, 74 Fed. Reg. at 59,039. According to the Federal
Reserve:
To the extent institutions adjust their pricing policies to respond to the potential
loss of income from overdraft fees, some consumers may experience increases
in certain upfront costs as a result of the final opt-in rule. Nonetheless, the
Board believes that giving consumers the choice to avoid the high cost of
overdraft fees, and the increased transparency in overdraft pricing that would
result from an opt-in rule, outweigh the potential increases in upfront costs. In
addition, some consumers will continue to be able to avoid monthly
maintenance or other account fees as a result of meeting minimum balance
requirements or having other product relationships with the bank.
Id.
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least for debit card overdrafts. In adopting the opt-in rule, the Federal
Reserve concluded that banks should not be allowed to offer customers the
choice of either a maintenance charge-“free” account with debit card
overdrafts or a monthly maintenance charge account without debit card
overdrafts. The Federal Reserve believed that if customers were given the
choice, many would mistakenly opt for the “free” account with overdraft
charges.219 This reasoning is directly at odds with the theory codified in the
Truth in Savings Act, that customers are best served when banks charge
avoidable penalty-type fees.220
As the Federal Reserve suspected, many banks’ first reaction to the
opt-in rule was to announce new maintenance fees for low-balance
accounts. Initial efforts at large banks were focused on accountholders
who used debit cards for purchases.221 Bad publicity, public outrage, and a
threatened loss of deposits led the largest banks to back away from their
plans to enact fees based on debit card use.222 Banks, however, were more
successful in raising standard maintenance fees and increasing the account
balance necessary to avoid these fees. According to Bankrate, only 45% of
banks now offer “free” checking, down from 76% in 2009.223
Commentators also believe that many banks are raising other “under the
radar” account fees to compensate for lost overdraft revenue.224 Ironically,
data suggest that many banks increased overdraft charges to compensate

219. Id. at 59,044–45.
220. See supra notes 191–193 and accompanying text.
221. See, e.g., Kathleen Pender, New Banking Rules Making Free Checking More
Elusive, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 4, 2011, at D1 (discussing Bank of America’s decision to “begin
charging most customers $5 a month for debit card usage”); Jennifer Saranow Schultz,
Debit Cards: A Hint of Fees, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2011, at B5 (raising the possibility that
U.S. Bankcorp would adopt a debit card fee in the wake of the new interchange rule).
222. Jennifer Bjorhus, Consumer Fury Forcing Banks to Kill Debit Fees, STAR TRIB.
(Minneapolis, Minn.), Nov. 2, 2011, at 1A.
223. See Dave Carpenter, For Frustrated Consumer, There Are Ways to Avoid or Reduce
Pesky Bank Fees, BOS. GLOBE, Nov. 5, 2011, at 7. While fee structure changes were partly
motivated by debit card overdraft rules, they were also motivated by new limits on debit
card interchange fees. Cf. supra notes 95-99 and accompanying text.
224. See Candice Choi, At Biggest Banks, Even a $5 Overdraft Can Trigger a Steep Fee,
Survey Shows, BOS. GLOBE, Aug. 5, 2011, at 10 (explaining that some banks either changed
the order of overdraft processing to increase fees or increased the number of overdraft fees
one customer could incur in a day); Eric Dash, Banks Quietly Ramp Up Costs to Consumers,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2011, at A1 (“‘Banks tried the in-your-face fee with debit cards, and
consumers said enough,’ said Alex Matjanec, a co-founder of MyBankTracker.com. ‘What
most people don’t realize is that they have been adding new charges or taking fees that have
always existed and increased them, or are making them harder to avoid.’”); see also Candice
Choi, Profit-Hungry Banks Are Apt to Levy New Fees, But They Can Often Be Avoided,
BOS. GLOBE, Dec. 16, 2011, at 9 (highlighting fees that “don’t get as much attention” like
TD Bank’s increase in fees for wire transfers and stop payment orders).
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for the fewer overdrafts incurred. According to Moebs $ervices, the
median overdraft fee increased from $27.50 in June 2011 to $30.00 in
November 2011.225 Moebs $ervices explained: “In almost 30 years of
collecting [overdraft] data we have never seen an increase as high as $2.50
at one time, especially in a five month period.”226 They attributed the
increase directly to the debit overdraft opt-in regulation.227
It is difficult to determine what this account re-pricing means in terms
of cross-subsidization. As previously discussed, consumers who repeatedly
overdrew their transaction accounts with small debit card purchases may
have been overpaying due to difficulty understanding the overdraft terms
and over-optimism about how successful they would be in avoiding
overdrafts.228 To the extent this was the case, the opt-in rule should at least
partly eliminate this overpayment by bringing the fee to consumers’
attention. If, however, the debit opt-in rule is not successful in correcting
any consumer cognitive biases, resulting higher overdraft and other hidden
fees may simply lead to continued customer overpayment. Again though,
overpayment alone does not equate to cross-subsidization.
Another example of recent regulatory action disfavoring overdraft fees
and encouraging consumer education is FDIC guidance regarding overdraft
fees incurred in a single day. The FDIC guidance provides that banks must
“[i]nstitute appropriate daily limits on customer costs by, for example,
limiting the number of transactions that will be subject to a fee or providing
a dollar limit on the total fees that will be imposed per day.”229 The
guidance further provides that the banks should identify customers who are
repeated overdraft users and offer them alternatives that might better meet
the customers’ needs.230
Other regulators may follow the FDIC lead. The OCC recently
proposed guidance that would similarly require banks to adopt “prudent
225. Press Release, Moebs $ervices, Overdraft Fee Revenue Falls as Banks Raise
Overdraft Prices (Jan. 18, 2012), available at http://www.moebs.com/Portals/0/pdf/Press%
20Releases/120111%20Moebs%20PR%20OD%20Revenue%20%20Price%20Final%20118-12%20(2).pdf.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. See supra notes 195–200 and accompanying text.
229. FDIC, Overdraft Payment Programs and Consumer Protection,
Final Overdraft Payment Supervisory Guidance, Fin. Inst. Letter FIL-81-2010, 4 (Nov. 24,
2010), available at http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/financial/2010/fil10081.pdf.
230. Id. The FDIC, nevertheless, made it clear that no bank was required to offer new
products as a substitute for transaction account overdrafts. See FDIC OVERDRAFT PAYMENT
PROGRAM SUPERVISORY GUIDANCE FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 4 (Apr. 1, 2011),
available at http://www.fdic.gov/news/conferences/overdraft/FAQ.pdf (“Is an institution
required to provide new alternatives to automated overdraft payment programs? No. Banks
are not required to develop new products in response to the Guidance.”).
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programmatic limitations on . . . the number of overdrafts and the total
amount of fees that may be imposed per day and per month.”231 Under the
proposed guidance, banks are also encouraged to provide customers “clear
and conspicuous disclosures” of account terms, including fees.232
Furthermore, the newly created Consumer Financial Protection Bureau has
launched an inquiry into transaction account overdraft fees.233 Among the
reforms the Bureau is considering is a “penalty fee box” that would display
overdraft and similar charges in a prominent location on consumers’
account statements.234 All of these proposals seem driven by the
philosophy that customers’ cognitive biases are causing some to overpay
for transaction account services.
In sum, existing fee regulations are contradictory. On the one hand,
OCC regulations and the Truth in Savings Act encourage high overdraft
and other penalty-type fees on the theory that banks should encourage
accountholders to engage in responsible behavior to avoid these fees. More
recent regulation discourages overdraft fees and encourages broad account
disclosures on the theory that consumer cognitive biases may lead some to
overpay for transaction accounts with large penalty fees. Given the
conflicting messages to banks, it is difficult to assess the extent to which
regulations impact banks’ account pricing. To the extent that overdraft and
penalty-type fees provide a breeding ground for consumers’ decisions to be
hampered by cognitive biases, earlier regulations may have led to some
consumers overpaying for transaction account services. The evidence
conflicts as to whether those most prone to the cognitive biases would have
been low-income customers. More recent efforts to encourage robust
disclosure, facilitate consumer choice, and limit large penalty charges could
potentially ameliorate harm from consumer cognitive bias. Finally, even if
some consumers overpay due in part to cognitive biases or fee regulations,
fee regulations do not offer any reason why banks would pass these
supracompetitive profits along to wealthy consumers.235

231. OCC, Proposed Guidance on Deposit-Related Consumer Credit Products, 76 Fed.
Reg. 33,409, 33,411 (June 8, 2011).
232. Id. at 33,410.
233. Edward Wyatt, Consumer Inquiry Focuses on Bank Overdraft Fees, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 22, 2012, at B7.
234. Press Release, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau Launches Inquiry into Overdraft Practices (Feb. 22, 2012), available at
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/pressreleases/consumer-financial-protection-bureaulaunches-inquiry-into-overdraft-practices/.
235. See Stucke, supra note 123, at 335–36.
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iv. Encouragement to Cross-Subsidize
In spite of growing concern about bank fees, policymakers have made
few attempts aimed at requiring or encouraging banks to cross-subsidize
transaction accounts for low-income consumers. This Part discusses
policymakers’ efforts to require or encourage banks to provide low-cost
transaction accounts, sometimes called “basic” accounts.236
Like
transaction account fee regulations, basic bank account policies have
sometimes suffered from conflicting theories about the fairest types of
account fees. Yet, there is little reason to believe that these regulatory
efforts have resulted in widespread cross-subsidization in the transaction
account market.
In the aftermath of transaction account interest rate deregulation, some
states adopted laws requiring banks to provide basic bank accounts.237 If
these laws require banks to provide transaction account services for less
than the incremental cost of the services, cross-subsidization might occur.
New Jersey seems to have contemplated this possibility. The New Jersey
statute specifically provides that “[n]o depository institution shall be
required to offer a New Jersey Consumer Checking Account at a cost
which is below its actual cost to provide such an account.”238 Thus, under
236. “Lifeline banking was the term originally used by those advocating the provision of
financial services at reduced prices.” Canner & Maland, supra note 146, at 256. However,
critics suggested that it was not fair to use a term that carried such “life-or-death
connotations.” Id. “Over time, then [the term] lifeline has largely given way to [the term]
basic.” Id.
237. New Jersey and New York require that banks make basic checking accounts
available for all consumers. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 17:16N-1, :16N-3 (West 2000)
(stating that in order to ensure banks “meet the basic banking needs of the communities in
which they are authorized to operate” those banks “that maintain[] regular checking
accounts in [New Jersey] shall make available to consumers a [basic checking account] at
all offices of that depository institution where regular checking accounts are offered or
available.”); N.Y. BANKING LAW § 14-f (McKinney 2008) (“It is the policy of this state that,
consistent with safe and sound banking practices, banking institutions make available lower
cost banking services to consumers.”). Illinois and Massachusetts require that banks make
basic checking accounts available to some consumers. 205 ILL. COMP. STAT. 605/4 (2011)
(“Every financial institution shall offer a Basic Checking Account to any natural person 65
years of age or older who requests such an account.”); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 167D, § 2
(2011) (providing basic checking accounts for consumers 18 or younger and 65 and older).
In addition, a Vermont statute authorizes its banking regulator to adopt rules requiring a
lifeline account if the regulator “finds a material deterioration in the availability and cost of
basic checking and savings account services in the results of any two consecutive surveys.”
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 10504 (West 2011). To the extent that these laws would require
national banks to provide basic accounts without regard to the cost of providing the
accounts, the state laws may be preempted by federal law governing national banks. See
supra note 177 and accompanying text.
238. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:16N-3(a).

HILL_FINAL; (DO NOT DELETE)

110

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

1/23/2013 10:30 PM

[Vol. 15:1

the New Jersey law, banks could still charge basic account customers at
least the incremental cost of providing the basic account. Assuming that
banks charged at least this incremental cost to low-income customers,
cross-subsidization would not occur.
Even outside of New Jersey, basic account laws are unlikely to lead to
cross-subsidization. Basic bank account laws typically allow banks to
charge some fees for the account—including overdraft fees—provided that
the fees do not exceed those for other accounts.239 Perhaps because these
fees can be substantial, New York has concluded that its law does not result
in the cross-subsidization of its basic account.240
It is possible that in the future, federal banking regulators will join the
basic bank account states in requiring low maintenance fee accounts for
some consumers. Depending on their construction, mandatory basic
accounts could force banks to price some transaction accounts below the
incremental cost of the service and lead to cross-subsidization. Federal
regulators have repeatedly experimented with basic banking projects but
have so far been unwilling to make such accounts mandatory.
In 2001, the Department of the Treasury (hereinafter “Treasury”)
began a program known as “First Accounts.”241 Under the program,
Treasury awarded grants to community-based non-profit organizations and
financial institutions in order to “provide low-cost checking or savings
accounts to ‘unbanked’ low- and moderate-income individuals.”242 This
created a direct subsidy to low-income consumers. Under the First
Accounts program, “85 percent of the accounts opened were savings
accounts” rather than transaction accounts.243 Of the two grant recipients
who focused primarily on transaction accounts, one experienced problems
like large overdrafts with nearly half of the new accounts opened.244 The

239. See 205 ILL. COMP. STAT. 605/4(c); N.J ADMIN. CODE § 3:1-19.2(a)(9) (2011);
Grace Sterrett, Basic Banking: New York’s Attempt to Democratize Banking Services, 49
CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 13, 14 (1995) (discussing the basic bank account regulation in
New York).
240. See Letter from Richard H. Neiman Superintendent of Banks, N.Y. State Banking
Dep’t, to Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. (June 4, 2010), available at http://www.banking.state.ny.
us/prlt100604.htm (“Based on data from the past 15 years since the basic banking account
was introduced by the New York Legislature, we find that the account is not a ‘loss-leader’
for banking institutions.”).
241. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FINDINGS FROM THE FIRST ACCOUNTS
PROGRAM (Jan. 2009).
242. Id. at iii.
243. Id. at 4-5 (“Thus for the most part, the First Accounts program helped participants
gain access to accounts that would support savings, but were not designed to encourage the
use of accounts for transactions.”).
244. See id. at 4-7, 12-11. That program, operated by Mission of Peace in conjunction
with Fifth Third Bank, offered checking accounts with no monthly fees or minimum
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First Accounts program did not attempt to determine whether the accounts
had been profitable for the financial institutions that participated.
More recently, the FDIC created a “Model Safe Accounts Template”
to provide banks “with guidelines for offering cost-effective
transactional . . . accounts that are safe and affordable for consumers.”245
The account template allows customers to maintain a minimum balance of
$1.246 While it does allow a monthly fee of up to $3, it does not allow any
overdraft or insufficient funds fees.247 The account is card-based and does
not allow customers to write checks.248
To help determine whether the Model Safe Accounts Template is
feasible, the FDIC conducted a pilot program.249 For one year beginning on
January 1, 2011, the FDIC collected information from nine banks that
volunteered to participate.250 While the nine participating banks were not a
representative group of financial institutions,251 the FDIC concluded that
“[t]he pilot showed that safe, low-cost accounts are valuable to consumers
and feasible for banks.”252 The FDIC was especially encouraged that only
about “20 percent of the transaction accounts were closed by the end of the
pilot.”253 By disallowing checks and overdraft transactions, banks were
able to limit the “instances of fraud or intentional mismanagement.”254
This suggests that currently unbanked consumers become stable customers
when offered transaction accounts with transparent and attractive terms.
The FDIC pilot, however, had a more difficult time determining
whether the accounts were economically feasible for the banks. The
participating banks “did not uniformly define and allocate fixed and
balances. Id. at 12-12. However, the accounts were subject a $30 charge per overdraft item.
Id. Under the Mission of Peace program, a grant of $425,316 translated into 660 checking
accounts. Id. at 12-1. To minimize losses, Fifth Third “monitored [the accounts] very
closely and closed [them] quickly if serious problems occurred.” Id. at 12-11.
245. FDIC
Model
Safe
Accounts
Template
(Aug.
4,
2011),
http://www.fdic.gov/consumers/template/template.pdf.
246. Id. Under the template, banks can require a $10 deposit to open an account. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. FDIC MODEL SAFE ACCOUNTS PILOT: FINAL REPORT (Apr. 2012), available at http
://www.fdic.gov/consumers/template/SafeAccountsFinalReport.pdf.
250. Id. at 1, 3.
251. Id. at 3, 5 (noting that the banks were Bath Savings Institution (Bath, ME), Citibank
(New York, NY), Cross County Savings Bank (Middle Village, NY), First State Bank
(Union City, TN), ING Direct (Wilmington, DE), Liberty Bank and Trust Company (New
Orleans, LA), Pinnacle Bank (Lincoln, NE), South Central Bank (Glasgow, KY), and
Webster Five Cents Saving Bank (Webster, MA)).
252. Id. at 3.
253. Id. at 5 (noting that this rate was lower than the industry-reported closure rate of
30% for regular transaction accounts).
254. Id. at 8.
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variable costs,” and “[i]nformation technology infrastructure limitations . . .
made it difficult [for banks] to monitor and track costs and revenues.”255
Some banks noted that the marginal costs of the accounts were low because
the accounts did not have check-related costs and because the accounts
generated income in the form of interchange fees.256 While this
information seems promising, it is still far from certain that such accounts
will generate income for banks—especially if banks are limited in their
ability to assess interchange fees.257
Although neither the First Accounts Program nor the FDIC Model
Safe Accounts Pilot provided detailed data on basic bank account costs,
further federal experimentation will occur.
The Dodd-Frank Act
authorized Treasury to implement a program of grants to “enable low- and
moderate-income individuals to establish one or more accounts in a
federally insured depository institution.”258 Regulators may eventually
decide to require that banks provide basic bank accounts. For now though,
no federal law requires banks to offer such accounts.
Regulators do, however, broadly encourage banks to consider
providing transaction accounts for underserved consumers. Under the
Community Reinvestment Act (CRA), banks are required to “serve the
convenience and needs of the communities in which they are chartered to
do business.”259 The “convenience and needs of the communities” includes
the need for “deposit services.”260
In spite of this ambitious language, the CRA’s enforcement
mechanisms are rather weak. Regulators evaluate a bank’s transaction
account offerings, along with its credit offerings, and assign the bank a
rating of outstanding, satisfactory, needs to improve, or substantial noncompliance.261 Regulators must then consider this rating when evaluating
the bank’s applications for new branches, mergers, and acquisitions.262
“While regulators only rarely deny such applications based on CRA
concerns, community groups can slow down the approval process

255. Id. at 7.
256. Id.
257. See supra notes 91-102 and accompanying text (discussing the Durbin Amendment
and the impact it may have on transaction account pricing).
258. 12 U.S.C. § 5623 (Supp. 2011); see also Financial Access Activities; Comment
Request, 76 Fed. Reg. 56,499, 56,500 (Sept. 13, 2011) (requesting comments “on how
[Treasury] can encourage activities that enable low- and moderate-income individuals to
establish one or more accounts in a federally insured depository institution and to improve
access to the provision of such accounts”).
259. 12 U.S.C. § 2901(a)(1) (Supp. 2011).
260. Id. § 2901(a)(2).
261. Id. § 2906(b)(2).
262. Id. §§ 2902(2), 2903.
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significantly with CRA protests.”263 Thus, it is possible that some banks
looking to expand or merge might offer below-cost transaction accounts to
low-income consumers to assuage any CRA-related concerns.
For example, when Washington Mutual acquired Great Western Bank
in 1997, Washington Mutual, among other things, promised two
community-based organizations that it would introduce a checking account
without a monthly fee or minimum balance requirement in a low-income
area.264 In exchange, the community-based organizations promised not to
oppose the acquisition.265 It is difficult to determine how often communitybased organizations successfully influence banks’ transaction account
fees.266 However, to the extent that the CRA is influential, it should
encourage progressive, rather than regressive, cross-subsidization because
community-based groups should be most concerned about low-income
individuals.267
It appears, then, that although current regulations do not require banks
to provide any service at a loss, the CRA might encourage some banks to
voluntarily do so. Low-income consumers are those most likely to be
helped or subsidized by the CRA.
C. Agency Problems
Agency problems, like regulations, could lead to cross-subsidization
in transaction account pricing. Banks, like other corporations, are run by
bank managers whose interests might not always align with the profitmaximizing interests of shareholders. Some community-minded financial
institutions may choose pricing structures that cross-subsidize transaction
accounts for low-income consumers.
Other banks, motivated by
discriminatory intent or a desire to grow, may choose pricing structures that
cross-subsidize a preferred group of consumers.
263. Stegman et al., supra note 29, at 409 n.15.
264. KENNETH H. THOMAS, THE CRA HANDBOOK 118-20 (1998).
265. Id.
266. See NATIONAL COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT COALITION, CRA COMMITMENTS 53-54
(Sept. 2007), available at http://www.community-wealth.org/_pdfs/articles-publications/
cdfis/report-silver-brown.pdf (identifying several CRA agreements that include provisions
for basic transaction accounts); Canner & Maland, supra note 146, at 258 n.8 (“In 16 out of
22 [CRA] agreements recently reviewed by Federal Reserve staff, basic banking was a
negotiated issue.”).
267. However, in at least some cases, the community-based organizations have sought
transaction accounts that could be classified as “free” under current bank advertising
regulations. See Thomas, supra note 264, at 120 (noting that WAMU promised to provide
“its widely-heralded Free Checking Account”). To the extent that these agreements simply
encourage banks to adopt pricing structures with high penalty fees, the CRA may have an
effect similar to that of the Truth in Savings Act’s advertising requirements.
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Some banks, especially community banks and credit unions, may lack
shareholder pressure to maximize profits.268 Credit unions, at least
according to law, are non-profit cooperative associations owned by
“members” who deposit money, rather than shareholders.269 While some
credit unions have now grown so large it is reasonable to believe they
behave like profit-maximizing large banks,270 smaller credit unions may be
more motivated by the will of their depositors. Similarly, closely held
banks may have shareholder constituencies made up largely of bank
depositors who live in the community serviced by the bank.271
Without shareholder pressure, some community banks and credit
unions may be willing to offer low-balance transaction accounts below cost
due to charitable or community-oriented non-profit goals.272 If there is
little competition in the transaction account market (or if large depositors
are also charitable), banks with such goals may finance these accounts by
paying less than market interest on high-balance transaction accounts.
As discussed earlier, small banks have different pricing structures than
large banks.273
In general, large banks charge higher fees.274
Unfortunately, it is difficult to determine why this difference in fee
structures exists. Perhaps it is because community banks and credit unions
are less profit-driven. Perhaps larger financial institutions are better able to
determine the costs of transaction account services and are therefore more

268. See Marc Schneiberg, Toward an Organizationally Diverse American Capitalism?
Cooperative, Mutual, and Local, State-Owned Enterprise, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1409,
1433 (2011) (“Community banks and credit unions are less subject to pressures to maximize
shareholder value than commercial banks.”).
269. See 12 U.S.C. § 1752(1) (Supp. 2011) (explaining that credit unions are organized
as cooperatives); 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(14)(A) (2011) (providing that credit unions, as nonprofit, mutual organizations, are exempt from federal income taxation).
270. See Wendy Cassity, Note, The Case for a Credit Union Community Reinvestment
Act, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 331, 361 (2000) (stating that a relaxed “common bond
membership policy has given credit unions bank-like incentives and powers”).
271. See Schneiberg, supra note 268, at 1425–26.
272. See James F. Bauerle, Regional Banking Outlook: Capital, 128 BANKING L.J. 180,
180 (2011) (stating that “[m]ost [community banks] have shareholder constituencies that
own shares out of loyalty to the communities where the banks are located rather than out of
desire for maximum return on equity”); Choe, supra note 29, at 367–68 (suggesting that
non-profit credit unions would be more likely to serve low-income consumers); Tony S.
Guo, Tenants at Foreclosure: Mitigating Harm to Innocent Victims of the Foreclosure
Crisis, 4 DEPAUL J. FOR SOC. JUST. 215, 252 n.201 (2011) (stating that “[c]ommunity banks
are ‘mission driven’ instead of ‘profit driven’”); Schneiberg, supra note 268, at 1433 (noting
that community banks and credit unions are “much more oriented to serving members and
clients than making a business of subjecting them to an endless stream of fees and
charges”).
273. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
274. Id.
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efficient in their pricing decisions.275 Perhaps larger banks are more able to
exercise market power.276 Perhaps larger banks have higher costs due to
their more extensive networks of ATMs and branches.277 Or perhaps small
banks have a greater need for deposits as a funding source and thus offer
more competitive prices.278
While some banks may be partly benevolent, other banks may be
partly malevolent. Some banks may engage in discriminatory behavior
manifested by pricing structures designed to discourage some consumers
from opening transaction accounts—even when those accounts might be
profitable for the bank. If this occurs, some consumers might pay higher
prices while other consumers pay lower prices.
The question of whether banks engage in economically inefficient
discrimination in lending has been widely studied. The results are mixed.
Some believe that banks often make discriminatory lending decisions,279
while others discount such claims.280 Even assuming significant credit
discrimination exists, that does not necessarily suggest that transaction
account discrimination also exists. Banks may have a greater opportunity
to discriminate in credit decisions because of the detailed customer
information they typically collect to evaluate borrowers’ credit risk.281 In
addition, anti-discrimination laws may provide strong disincentives for
banks to discriminate against protected classes in the provision of
transaction accounts. For these reasons, widespread discriminatory intent
in the provision of transaction accounts is probably unlikely.
Some managers might have incentives that lead them to maximize
bank size rather than bank profits. Managers of larger firms tend to have

275. See supra Part III.A (discussing information deficiencies).
276. See supra notes 121-123 and accompanying text.
277. See Victoria Finkle, Free Checking Isn’t Cheap for Banks, AM. BANKER, Dec. 12,
2011, at 2 (reporting that “[o]verhead, or the institutional costs not associated with a specific
division or service” is higher at the largest banks). But see Legislative Highlights, AM.
BANKR. INST. J., Apr. 2011, at 8 (stating that small banks have higher per-transaction
operating costs).
278. Cf. KOCH & MACDONALD, supra note 69, at 391–92 (noting small banks’ limited
access to international capital markets and reliance on deposits as a source of funding).
279. See, e.g., William C. Apgar & Allegra Calder, Joint Center for Housing Studies at
Harvard University, The Dual Mortgage Market: The Persistence of Discrimination in
Mortgage Lending, in THE GEOGRAPHY OF OPPORTUNITY: RACE AND HOUSING CHOICE IN
METROPOLITAN AMERICA (Xavier de Souza Briggs ed. 2005), available at
http://jchs.unix.fas.harvard.edu/sites/jchs.harvard.edu/files/w05-11.pdf.
280. See, e.g., Peter P. Swire, Equality of Opportunity and Investment in
Creditworthiness, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1533 (1995) (concluding that creditworthiness, rather
than redlining, is responsible for minorities’ lack of credit).
281. James T. Lindley et al., Racial Discrimination in the Provision of Financial Service,
74 AM. ECON. REV. 735, 736 (1984).
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higher salaries.282 They may also have “increased prestige[] and other
perquisites.”283 A bank manager seeking to maximize the size of the bank’s
deposit base may choose a cross-subsidizing transaction account pricing
structure if the bank has market power sufficient to retain the accounts that
are over-paying.
A disconnect between the FDIC’s interest as deposit insurer and
banks’ interest in maximizing shareholder value may provide an even
stronger incentive for banks to grow large. When one of the largest banks
gets into financial trouble, the government often provides bailout funds. In
contrast, when a small bank encounters financial difficulty, regulators close
the bank. Although the Dodd-Frank Act aimed to reduce the risk posed by
large financial institutions,284 most commentators believe the too-big-to-fail
problem still exists.285 In such an environment, banks—particularly those
within striking distance of “systemically important” status—may have an
incentive to cross-subsidize some transaction accounts. To these banks,
increasing the deposit base may be more beneficial than the costs incurred
in providing transaction accounts.
It is unclear whether the unprofitable accounts added by this type of

282. See, e.g., Aigbe Akhigbe et al., CEO Compensation and Performance of
Commercial Banks, 23 MANAGERIAL FIN. 40, 40 (1997) (finding that bank size is “positively
related to the total compensation (including salary, bonus, and stock options) levels of bank
CEOs”); Henry L. Tosi et al., How Much Does Performance Matter? A Meta-Analysis of
CEO Pay Studies, 26 J. MGMT. 301, 329 (concluding that “organizational size [is] an
important determinant of total CEO pay”).
283. Wilmarth, supra note 90, at 288.
284. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No.
11-203, 124 Stat. at 1376 (stating that the purpose of the Act was “[t]o promote the financial
stability of the United States by improving accountability and transparency in the financial
system, to end ‘too big to fail’, to protect the American taxpayer by ending bailouts, to
protect consumers from abusive financial services practices, and for other purposes”).
285. See, e.g., Lissa Lamkin Broome, The Dodd-Frank Act: TARP Bailout Backlash and
Too Big to Fail, 15 N.C. BANKING INST. 69, 81 (2011) (noting that “Dodd-Frank provides a
framework for ending too big to fail if the regulators have the will”); Adam J. Levitin, In
Defense of Bailouts, 99 GEO. L.J. 435, 439 (2011) (concluding that large bank bailouts are
“an inevitable feature of modern economies, in which the interconnectedness of firms means
that the entire economy bears the risk of an individual firm’s failure”); Arthur E. Wilmarth,
Jr., The Dodd-Frank Act: A Flawed and Inadequate Response to the Too-Big-to-Fail
Problem, 89 OR. L. REV. 951, 954 (2011) (concluding that “Dodd-Frank’s provisions fall far
short of the changes that would be needed to prevent future taxpayer-financed bailouts and
to remove other public subsidies for [too-big-to-fail] institutions”). Even Senator Dodd, for
whom the Act is named, seems skeptical of the Act’s chances of success. He now claims
the Act was “not meant to prevent another bank from being too big to fail.” Rather it was
meant to “prevent [failures] from metastasizing so that they we [sic] can avoid another
Lehman style bankruptcy.” Laura Goldman, Dodd Backs Away from Namesake Bill, NAKED
PHILADELPHIAN, (July 8, 2011, 12:07 PM), http://nakedphiladelphian.blogspot.com/2011/07/
dodd-backs-away-from-namesake-bill.html.
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expansion would belong to low-income or upper-income consumers. On
one hand, in theory a bank could grow its deposit base most quickly by
adding high-balance accounts. On the other hand, the cross-subsidization
experienced when banks could not pay interest on deposit accounts286
suggests that banks might not be that efficient in attracting one particular
type of account, while excluding other types of accounts.
D. Theoretical Explanations of Cross-Subsidization
It appears, then, that several theories suggest that some groups of
accountholders might pay more than the stand-alone cost of providing
services to that group. Banks may not be able to accurately assess the cost
and attach an appropriate price to some transaction accounts. Laws
limiting new bank charters and expansion of existing banks might lead
some banks to exercise market power. In addition, OCC regulations and
the Truth in Savings Act might encourage banks to set high overdraft and
penalty fees. To the extent that consumers have few alternatives to these
high fee accounts or are unable to accurately assess the costs they will
incur, these accountholders may pay more than the stand-alone cost for
transaction account services.
At the same time, several theories could explain why some
accountholders might pay less than the incremental cost to the bank of
providing the account. Again, information deficiencies might cause some
banks to adopt pricing structures where some accountholders underpay for
the services they receive. The CRA might motivate banks to agree to
provide some low-income consumers account services at a loss in order to
facilitate regulatory approval of bank expansion or mergers. To the extent
that other accountholders pay more than their stand-alone costs, the CRA
could result in progressive cross-subsidization. Finally, agency problems
might lead some banks to cross-subsidize some accounts. In particular,
management’s desire for growth might lead banks to adopt pricing
structures that cross-subsidize some accounts. It is unclear whether this
subsidy would flow to low-income or high-income consumers.
At best, a theoretical examination of transaction accounts yields mixed
results. While explanations for regressive cross-subsidization exist,
explanations for progressive cross-subsidization also exist.
IV.

OVERDRAFT FEES AND CROSS-SUBSIDIZATION

In an effort to better understand whether regressive cross286. See supra Part III.B.3.

HILL_FINAL; (DO NOT DELETE)

118

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

1/23/2013 10:30 PM

[Vol. 15:1

subsidization occurs, this Part explores existing empirical evidence
concerning the prices and costs of transaction accounts. Its structure tracks
Gerald Faulhaber’s definition of subsidy-free prices.287 First, is the revenue
from each group of accounts less than the stand-alone costs of providing
service to that group? If the poor are paying more than the stand-alone cost
of service, they would be better off seeking an alternative arrangement.
Second, do all transaction accounts cover at least the incremental cost of
providing those accounts? If the rich are paying less than the incremental
cost of service, cross-subsidization could be present. As acknowledged in
Part I.B, establishing or refuting cross-subsidization can be data intensive
and difficult. This Part concludes that existing data are not sufficient to
clearly establish the existence of regressive cross-subsidization in
transaction accounts. In particular, high-balance accounts likely generate at
least enough revenue to cover the incremental cost of service.
A. Are the Poor Over Paying?
Under Faulhaber’s approach, subsidy-free prices exist only when no
group of consumers pays more than the stand-alone cost of service.
Regressive cross-subsidization could exist if high overdraft accounts would
be better off (would pay lower prices) by seeking an alternative
arrangement.
It is undeniable that some consumers rack up huge overdraft fees on
their transaction accounts. A single overdraft fee can range between $10
and $38, depending on the bank.288 Some consumers can incur multiple
overdraft charges in a single day.289 Given the large nature of these charges
it is difficult not to agree with a conclusion reached by the Pew Health
Group: “Overdraft fees far exceed the incremental cost to the bank of
providing this service since these transactions, designed to be paid back
with the customer’s next deposit, pose minimal credit risk.”290
But would low-income consumers who pay high overdraft fees be

287. See supra Part I.B.
288. See FDIC, OVERDRAFT STUDY, supra note 77, at 16, 18, 24 (finding a range of
overdraft fees from $10 to $38, with a median of $27, for overdrafts at banks with
automated overdraft protection); PEW HEALTH GROUP, HIDDEN RISKS: THE CASE FOR SAFE
AND
TRANSPARENT CHECKING ACCOUNTS 12 (Apr. 2011), available at
http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/Safe_
Banking_Opportunities_Project/Pew_Report_HiddenRisks.pdf [hereinafter PEW, CHECKING
ACCOUNT STUDY] (finding a range of $10 to $36, with a median of $35 at the ten largest
banks in the U.S.).
289. See PEW, CHECKING ACCOUNT STUDY, supra note 288, at 12 (reporting that the ten
largest banks all allow multiple overdraft charges per day).
290. Id. at 14 (emphasis added).
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better off seeking an alternative arrangement? What would it cost to set up
a stand-alone system that only provided transaction accounts to low-income
consumers who repeatedly overdraw their accounts? It is difficult to
determine the answers to these questions because no such system exists.
Nevertheless, comparing similar products sheds some light on this
question.
First, it might be reasonable to assume that the cost of a hypothetical
arrangement for low-income consumers would cost roughly the same as a
system for all consumers. To provide transaction account services to lowincome consumers, a service provider would still need a physical location,
staff, and technology. As discussed below, the cost of providing the
average checking account when considering fixed costs ranges from $250
to $300 per year.291 Using these figures, a low-balance account without a
monthly fee with a $25 overdraft charge, would need between ten and
twelve overdrafts a year. An account with twenty overdrafts per year could
potentially be profitable with a charge of only $12.50 per overdraft,
assuming no higher risk of charge-off.292 But even this amount is higher
than the overdraft charge at some banks, suggesting that perhaps not many
low-income consumers would benefit from an alternative arrangement.
Another potential reference point for the hypothetical cost of
providing low-income transaction accounts is the prepaid card industry.
Prepaid cards, also called stored-value cards, are “device[s] that provide[]
access to a specified amount of funds for making payments to others.”293
While there are many different types of prepaid cards, general purpose
reloadable prepaid cards are the products that most closely approximate
transaction accounts.294 Consumers using these prepaid cards can receive
automatic deposits, use the card to pay bills and make purchases, and
withdraw money from ATM machines. Unlike most transaction accounts,
many prepaid cards do not allow the consumer to overdraw the card; the

291. See infra notes 338–339.
292. In considering the hypothetical stand-alone cost, annual average cost of mid-sized
or small banks are probably a better proxy than the average annual cost of the largest banks.
However, when using the average annual cost of $350 to $450 for the largest banks (see
Kapner, infra note 339, at C1) and the $35 average overdraft fee at the largest banks (see
PEW, CHECKING ACCOUNT STUDY, supra note 288, at 12), an account could recover its standalone cost at ten overdrafts per year.
293. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1301, 1556 (9th ed. 2009).
294. See Anisha Sekar, The AmEx Prepaid Debit Card’s Dirty Little Secret,
NERDWALLET (June 22, 2011), http://www.nerdwallet.com/blog/2011/amex-prepaid-debitdirty-little-secret/ (“The primary reason to get a prepaid debit card is to avoid having a
checking account to begin with, whether because you can’t make the minimum balance
requirements to avoid paying fees, or because you simply don’t want to keep your cash with
a bank.”).
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consumer can only spend money that has already been loaded on the
card.295 For this reason, prepaid cards do not typically charge an overdraft
fee. They do, however, charge other fees. These fees vary widely by card
provider, but often include a fee to load money on the card.
Some research suggests that current prepaid cards are a cost-efficient
alternative to transaction accounts for those consumers who would
typically maintain a low transaction account balance.296 If this is correct, it
could suggest that at least some transaction account consumers would be
better served by making alternative arrangements. However, the prepaid
product is not perfectly akin to the transaction account. Prepaid card
networks might be less costly for service providers to offer because they do
not extend credit in the form of paid overdrafts and do not offer checkwriting services.297 In addition, some research concludes that current
prepaid cards are actually more expensive than transaction accounts.298 At
any rate, the current evidence from the prepaid card market is insufficient
to conclude that transaction accountholders with overdraft charges are
paying more than the stand-alone cost of the service they receive.
Credit products might also be partial substitutes for transaction
accountholders with repeated overdrafts. Credit cards are the credit
products that are functionally closest to transaction account overdrafts.299
295. See Gail Hillebrand, Before the Grand Rethinking: Five Things to Do Today With
Payments Law and Ten Principles to Guide New Payments Products and New Payments
Law, 83 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 769, 784 n.36 (2008) (noting that some cards, for example the
Wal-Mart money card, are not set up to allow overdrafts). But see Will Hernandez, Prepaid
Benefit Cards Draw Fire, AM. BANKER, May 17, 2011, at 6 (noting that U.S. Bank “charges
$10 to $20 in overdraft fees on prepaid cards it issues in Arkansas, Idaho, Nebraska, Ohio,
and Oregon”).
296. See G. MICHAEL FLORES, BRETTON WOODS, INC., ANALYSIS OF RELOADABLE
PREPAID CARDS IN AN ENVIRONMENT OF RISING CONSUMER BANKING FEES 12-13 (Mar.
2011), available at http://bretton-woods.com/media/51f57d9869e66aa1ffff8159ffffd502
.pdf. (finding that average prepaid card users incurred fees between $76 and $380 annually
and the transaction account users with the same basic use pattern would spend $218 to $314
annually).
297. The prepaid card also offers some conveniences the typical transaction account does
not. For example, prepaid cards can be purchased and loaded in a variety of locations.
Many of these locations have more convenient hours than bank branches.
298. See CONSUMERS UNION, ADDING IT ALL UP: HOW PREPAID CARD FEES COMPARE TO
CHECKING ACCOUNT FEES (Apr. 4, 2011), available at http://www.defendyourdollars.org/
pdf/Adding-It-All-Up.pdf. The major difference between the Bretton Woods study and the
Consumers Union study appears to be the way overdraft charges were included for
transaction accounts. The Bretton Woods study assumed five overdraft fees a year, while
the Consumers Unions study does not explicitly consider overdraft fees. See Phyllis
Furman, Prepaid Debit Cards No Bargain, Consumer Group Sez, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Apr. 7,
2011, at 35. Thus, a debit card may be more expensive than a prepaid card for the consumer
who does not use overdrafts, but less expensive for the consumer who does use overdrafts.
299. See L. Ali Khan, A Theoretical Analysis of Payment Systems, 60 S.C. L. REV. 425,

HILL_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

1/23/2013 10:30 PM

TRANSACTION ACCOUNT FEES

121

With both debit cards and credit cards, the consumer can make a purchase
using a card and repay the loan later.300 Most observers agree that credit
cards are generally a cheaper form of credit than overdrafts.301 The FDIC
Study of Bank Overdraft Programs (FDIC Overdraft Study) explained that
when viewed as credit products, overdrafts can be costly.
Assuming a $27 overdraft fee (the survey median), a customer
repaying a $20 [point-of-sale] debit overdraft in two weeks
would incur an APR of 3,520 percent; a customer repaying a $60
ATM overdraft in two weeks would incur an APR of 1,173
percent; and a customer repaying a $66 check overdraft in two
weeks would incur an APR of 1,067 percent. More rapid
repayment of the overdraft amount results in higher APRs, and
slower repayment results in lower APRs.302
In comparison, average credit card rates are around 15%.303 While some
credit card customers pay above average interest rates or incur fees that
push their cost of borrowing higher,304 credit cards are often cheaper than
overdrafts.
481 (2008) (“When a bank extends a line of credit to an account holder, whether in the form
of overdraft facility in a checking account or revolving credit in a credit card account, the
bank obligates itself to comply with the account holder’s authorized payment orders. Thus,
no meaningful distinction separates an overdraft account from a credit account.”); Joseph U.
Schorer, The Credit Card Act of 2009: Credit Card Reform and the Uneasy Case for
Disclosure, 127 BANKING L.J. 924, 956 n.1 (2010) (noting that credit cards and overdrafts of
transaction accounts are both revolving lines of credit).
300. See Martin, supra note 196, at 1 (noting the similar appearance of debit and credit
cards). In the case of a transaction account, the consumer can also write a check or perhaps
use an electronic transfer.
301. In 2004, federal banking regulators issued a brochure to educate consumers about
overdraft charges. The brochure suggested that linking a transaction account with a cash
advance on a credit card could provide a less costly alternative to overdrafts. BD. OF
GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE ET AL., PROTECTING YOURSELF FROM OVERDRAFT AND
BOUNCED-CHECK FEES (2004), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bounce/
bounce.pdf. But see Zywicki, supra note 210, at 1167 n.81 (noting that “[c]redit cards are
not always a less expensive alternative than payday lending or overdraft protection for those
whose usage tends to trigger substantial behavior-based fees”).
302. See FDIC, OVERDRAFT STUDY, supra note 77, at v n.8 (“These examples assume
that the credit extended as a result of the overdraft occurrence equaled the total transaction,
that the consumer repaid the credit extended in two weeks, and that no additional fees are
imposed on the consumer as a result of the [overdraft]. The APRs were calculated as
follows: ((Fee Charged/Amount financed)*365)/Term (14 days).”).
303. Tim Devaney, Credit Card Interest Remains High While Other Rates Stay Low:
Average at 15.14 Percent Nationally, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2012, at A10.
304. Some credit cards assess annual fees. Many collect fees for extras like cash
advances and balance transfers. Most also assess late charges if a payment is not made on
time. See Jason Ashley Wright, Credit: A Fact of Life, TULSA WORLD, Aug. 13, 2012, at
D1.
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Credit cards, however, have features that may make them a suboptimal substitute for overdrafts.305 As Professor Ronald J. Mann explains,
credit cards can lead some consumers to spend and borrow more than they
otherwise would.306 Racking up credit card debt can contribute to financial
distress and even bankruptcy.307 Thus, some consumers might rationally
avoid credit cards, on the theory that their cost is far more than the interest
rate and fees credit cards assess.308 It is, therefore, difficult to conclude that
transaction account fees exceed the stand-alone cost of account service
based solely on a comparison of credit card prices.
Beyond this difficulty, credit cards may not be comparable to
transaction accounts. Some consumers may use overdrafts because they do
not have access to credit cards. Overdraft users tend to have lower credit
scores than those who do not use overdrafts. A Moebs $ervices study
found that “the lower the [credit] score the higher the incidence of
overdraft behavior and the more overdrafts.”309 Similarly a survey
conducted by the Raddon Financial Group found that of the consumers
surveyed who were frequent users of overdrafts, 38% self-described their
credit rating as “fair” and 32% described their credit rating as “poor.”310
Consumers with low credit scores may not be able to secure a credit card,
especially in financial environments where credit is tight.311 Lack of credit
305. See Ronald J. Mann & Jim Hawkins, Just Until Payday, 54 UCLA L. REV. 855, 890
(2007) (“If forcing customers to overdrafts is bad because they are expensive and opaque,
shifting consumers to credit cards is much worse.”).
306. See RONALD J. MANN, CHARGING AHEAD: THE GROWTH AND REGULATION OF
PAYMENT CARD MARKETS 45–72 (2006).
307. See id.; see also Jim Hawkins, Regulating on the Fringe: Reexamining the Link
Between Fringe Banking and Financial Distress, 86 IND. L.J. 1361, 1373–75 (explaining
that credit cards cause financial distress because they allow consumers to accumulate a large
amount of debt in a relatively painless way).
308. For example, Professor Katherine Porter notes that consumers are often reluctant to
engage in significant credit card borrowing after a bankruptcy. Katherine Porter, Life After
Debt: Understanding the Credit Restraint of Bankruptcy Debtors, 18 AM. BANKR. INST. L.
REV. 1, 37 (2010).
309. See Press Release, Moebs $ervices, Who Uses Overdrafts (Sept. 29, 2009),
available at http://www.moebs.com/PressReleases/tabid/58/ctl/Details/mid/380/ItemID/194/
Default.aspx (finding that only credit score was significantly correlated with overdraft use).
310. See Raddon Financial Group, Inc., Custom Survey Research Findings 33 (June
2011) (unpublished survey results on file with author) (reporting a survey conducted by the
Raddon Financial Group of customers at a single financial institution) [hereinafter Raddon
Survey]. By comparison, 17% of the consumers who did not use overdraft credit reported
“fair” credit. Id. Only 9% of non-overdraft users reported “poor” credit. Id.
311. When banks experienced difficulty in the fall of 2008, approximately 60% of banks
responded by tightening their lending standards for new credit cards and lowering credit
limits on existing accounts. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., OCTOBER 2008
SENIOR LOAN OFFICER OPINION SURVEY ON BANK LENDING PRACTICES 5, available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/snloansurvey/200811/fullreport.pdf. “After years
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card availability may explain why when asked what they would do if they
did not have access to overdraft credit, only 10% of one bank’s customers
reported they would use a credit card.312 For consumers without access to
credit cards, the cost of credit card borrowing is not a reasonable proxy for
the stand-alone cost of transaction account services.
Instead, it may be more reasonable to consider the cost of payday
loans as an approximation of the stand-alone cost of overdraft credit. If a
transaction accountholder cannot secure (or has already reached the credit
limit on) a credit card, then the accountholder might seek to substitute
overdrafts with other high cost borrowing like payday loans.313 While
payday loans are not generally regarded as a consumer-friendly option,314 in
some cases payday loans can be more cost-effective than overdraft fees.315
Whether or not this is true in any given circumstance probably
depends at least partly on the size and duration of the loan. As previously
discussed, most banks charge a flat overdraft fee of around $30, which is
not dependant on the size of the overdraft.316 This means that low dollar
overdrafts that are repaid quickly end up with a high annual percentage
rate, which measures the cost of borrowing over a year.317 In contrast,
payday loans are typically priced according to the amount borrowed. On
average, payday loan customers pay between $15 and $20 per $100
of mailing cards out to just about anybody, banks [were] suddenly freezing out all but the
most credit worthy customers.” Jane J. Kim, Banks Get Picky In Doling Out Credit Cards,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 5, 2009, at D1. In such conditions, even previous overdrafts may
disqualify consumers from some credit card offers. See Drew K. Kifner, Alien to Financial
Services: Should Social Security Numbers be Required for Banking Services Provided to
Immigrants?, 12 N.C. BANKING INST. 303, 308–09 (2008) (describing a Bank of America
credit card that required customers hold a checking account with no overdrafts for three
months).
312. Raddon Survey, supra note 310, at 30. Another 6% of survey respondents reported
that they would apply for a credit card. Id.
313. See Mann & Hawkins, supra note 305, at 889 (“[I]t seems fairly clear that overdraft
products are more expensive than payday lending products.”); Donald P. Morgan et al., How
Payday Credit Access Affects Overdrafts and Other Outcomes, 44 J. MONEY, CREDIT &
BANKING 519, 521 (2012) (“Payday credit is closely akin to the overdraft credit
(“protection”) supplied by depository institutions. Both financial intermediaries supply
credit by postponing depositing a check or debiting an account for a time, providing float in
the interim.”).
314. See generally CHRISTOPHER L. PETERSON, TAMING THE SHARKS: TOWARDS A CURE
FOR THE HIGH-COST CREDIT MARKET (2004).
315. See Mann & Hawkins, supra note 305, at 889; William M. Webster, IV, Payday
Loan Prohibitions: Protecting Financially Challenged Consumers or Pushing Them over
the Edge?, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1051, 1062 (2012) (“While . . . overdraft programs
generally are quite profitable for depositories, they frequently are far more costly to
consumers than payday advances.”).
316. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
317. See supra note 302 and accompanying text.
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borrowed.318 Payday loans are typically outstanding until the borrower’s
next payday—usually in two to four weeks.319 “For loans of about $200,
the price is about equal, and for loans of $300 or above, a single overdraft
loan typically will be less expensive. This calculation will vary, of course,
depending on whether the consumer is making one overdraft or more.”320
Some empirical evidence suggests that consumers do consider payday
loans a substitute for transaction account overdrafts. Brian Melzer and
Donald Morgan studied how overdraft fees varied based on the availability
of payday loans.321 They found that “overdraft fees are roughly 5% lower
when payday lenders are absent.”322 Banks also varied their overdraft
credit offerings depending on the availability of payday loans. In the
absence of payday lenders, banks were “less likely to offer [overdraft
protection] programs, and those still offering [overdraft protection] lower
their credit limits.”323 Thus, Professor Melzer and Federal Reserve
Economist Morgan conclude that there is “competition between payday
lenders and overdraft credit providers.”324
Melzer and Morgan’s conclusions are curious because we might have
expected a lack of competition from payday lenders to increase overdraft
fees, but Melzer and Morgan found the opposite. They hypothesize that
“overdraft prices decline when payday loans are prohibited because
overdraft providers sustain lower credit losses as they reduce credit
limits.”325 Explaining the change in overdraft offerings is trickier. Melzer
and Morgan offer two hypotheses, but both rely on the idea that in the
presence of payday lenders some consumers use payday lenders as a
substitute for overdraft credit, and banks then react to changing consumer
318. See Press Release, Moebs $ervices, PayDay Loans Are a Better Deal for Consumers
Than
Overdraft
Fees
(Jul.
12,
2010),
available
at
http://www.moebs.com/PressReleases/tabid/58/ctl/Details/mid/380/ItemID/169/Default.asp
x (“Consumers who use a payday advance loan for $100 or less will pay an average of
$17.97 . . . .”); Mann & Hawkins, supra note 305, at 861–62 (“In financial terms, [a payday
loan] is a very short-term, single-payment loan, in which the lender extends a loan on one
date in return for a promise (usually evidenced by a postdated check or by automated
clearinghouse (ACH) authorization) to repay the amount of the loan plus a standard fee,
typically in the range of $15 to $20 per $100 borrowed.”) (citations omitted); Webster,
supra note 315, at 1051–52 (stating that the “typical” fee for a payday loan is “$15 per $100
borrowed”).
319. See Mann & Hawkins, supra note 305, at 862–63.
320. Zywicki, supra note 210, at 1170.
321. Brian Melzer & Donald P. Morgan, Competition in a Consumer Loan Market:
Payday Loans and Overdraft Credit (July 5, 2012) (Working Paper), available at http://
www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/faculty/melzer/Papers/Melzer_Morgan_7_12_2012.pdf.
322. Id. at 2.
323. Id. at 2–3.
324. Id. at 3.
325. Id.
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behavior.326 At a minimum, Melzer and Morgan’s work suggests that when
presented with a choice between overdraft and payday credit, some
consumers make an economically rational choice.
Yet evidence still suggests that some consumers repeatedly incur large
overdraft fees to gain only a small amount of credit. For example, the
FDIC Overdraft Study found that “[t]he median dollar amount [of overdraft
loans was] $36.”327 Consumers who incur low-dollar overdrafts are not
necessarily irrational. Payday loans and overdraft credit are not perfect
substitutes for each other. Some consumers might rationally prefer the
overdraft because of functionally different ways these two forms of credit
operate. As Professor Zywicki explains, “payday loans are less convenient
and flexible than traditional overdraft loans, including the time and ‘shoe
leather’ costs of going to a payday lender, waiting in line, and then
delivering the cash to a bank or to pay a bill.”328 In other circumstances, a
payday loan might not be a reasonable alternative—for example, when the
consumer had an emergency329 or lives in an area where regulation has
limited payday lending.330 Yet even accounting for the convenience and
other factors associated with overdraft credit, it seems possible that at least
some consumers overpay for overdraft credit.
In sum, there is simply not enough evidence to conclude that the poor
are systematically overpaying for transaction account services. It is
difficult to determine what it might cost to provide stand-alone transaction
account services for the poor. Comparing transaction account fees to other
potentially comparable services like prepaid cards, credit cards, and payday
loans is far from conclusive. None of the comparable products closely
approximate all of the services provided by a transaction account. Yet in
each of these cases, there is at least some evidence that the alternative
product can be less costly than the equivalent transaction account. This
leaves open the possibility that some consumers are paying more than the
stand-alone cost of their transaction accounts. Further research would be

326. Id. at 3–4.
327. FDIC, OVERDRAFT STUDY, supra note 77, at 79. The study further found:
[Debit card] transactions were not only the most frequent, but also the smallest,
with a median value of $20. The median transaction size of an ATM
withdrawal and a check that resulted in an [overdraft] transaction were $60 and
$66, respectively. [Automated Clearinghouse overdraft] transactions showed
the largest median at $78.
Id.
328. Zywicki, supra note 210, at 1168.
329. See id. (noting that “payday loans might not even be realistically available in some
situations, such as when traveling or in an emergency”).
330. See Jonathan Zinman, Restricting Consumer Credit Access: Household Survey
Evidence on Effects Around the Oregon Rate Cap, 34 J. BANKING & FIN. 546, 547 (2010).
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necessary to determine the extent of the overpayment and the
demographics of those who are overpaying.
B. Are the Rich Under Paying?
Under Faulhaber’s second condition, subsidy-free prices exist only if
each group of consumers pays at least the incremental cost to the bank of
providing the accounts. Regressive cross-subsidization could exist if
revenues from transaction accounts held by upper-income consumers do
not cover the bank’s incremental costs of providing the transaction
accounts.
It is difficult to establish that upper-income consumers pay more than
the marginal cost of service. Critics of current account fees point to the
previously discussed FDIC Overdraft Study,331 suggesting that upperincome accountholders pay few overdraft fees.332 The study found that
“[a]bout 62 percent of accounts in low-income areas had zero [overdraft]
charges, while 78.2 percent of accounts in upper-income areas had zero
[overdraft] charges.”333 It further found that accounts in upper-income
areas were much less likely to incur multiple overdraft charges in a year.334
However, this information alone is insufficient to conclude that upperincome consumers do not cover the marginal cost of service. As
previously discussed, other studies have not found a link between lowincome state and overdrafts incurred.335 In addition, simply comparing the
overdrafts incurred by various accounts does not take into account the
income that a high-balance account would generate for a bank. The FDIC
Overdraft Study found that accounts in middle- and upper-income locations
were more likely to have higher average balances.336 For that reason, it is
difficult to tell whether differences in fees paid by low-income consumers
when compared with middle- and upper-income consumers are attributable
to cross-subsidization or to efficient pricing structures.

331. FDIC, OVERDRAFT STUDY, supra note 77.
332. See, e.g., Protecting Consumers from Abusive Overdraft Fees: The Fairness and
Accountability in Receiving Overdraft Coverage Act: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Banking, Housing, & Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 34-36 (2009) (written statement of Jean
Ann Fox, Dir., Consumer Fed’n of Am.) (using the FDIC Overdraft Study to advocate new
overdraft legislation).
333. FDIC, OVERDRAFT STUDY, supra note 77, at 77.
334. Id.
335. See supra notes 207–209 and accompanying text.
336. “Middle- and upper-income areas had approximately one-third of accounts with less
than $100 and about one quarter of accounts with an average balance of $3,000 or more.”
FDIC, OVERDRAFT STUDY, supra note 77, at 76. In contrast, “more than half (56.7 percent)
of the micro-data accounts in low-income areas held less than $100, on average.” Id.
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Reports often claim that many transaction accounts are “unprofitable”
for banks. “Unprofitable” accounts could indicate the presence of crosssubsidization. The estimated percentage of “unprofitable” accounts varies
widely, but is often reported to be more than 50% of all accounts.337 These
estimates, however, are largely unhelpful for cross-subsidization analysis
because they likely include fixed costs. The estimates that disclose cost
calculations put the annual cost of providing a transaction account between
$250 and $300.338 These cost data are consistent with average annual cost
data (including fixed costs) from other sources.339
However, the incremental cost of a new transaction account is likely
much lower than the $250 to $300 “average” annual cost of providing a
transaction account. A 2005 article placed the annual “incremental front
and back office costs on a checking account . . . between $50 and $60.”340

337. See Mike Branton, StrategyCorps, What to Do with Unprofitable Retail Checking
Accounts (Dec. 2010), available at http://www.ababj.com/white-papers-2010/what-to-dowith-unprofitable-retail-checking-accounts.html (“A recent survey by Strategy Corps of 150
retail banking executives shows that 96% said at least 30% of their retail checking accounts
were unprofitable.”); Sandra Block, Building a Bridge to the ‘Unbanked:’ FDIC Votes
Today on Plan to Set up No-Frills, Low-Cost Checking, Savings Accounts, USA TODAY,
Aug. 10, 2010, at 6A (“A 2009 analysis by Novantas, a consulting firm, estimated that even
in a ‘good’ year, about half of checking accounts are unprofitable, and that regulatory and
economic changes could raise that figure to 75%.”); Robin Sidel & Dan Fitzpatrick, The
End Is Near for Free Checking, WALL ST. J., June 16, 2010, at A1 (“More than half of all
checking accounts are currently unprofitable, according to a report issued last month by
Celent, a unit of Marsh & McLennan Cos.”); Hank Israel & Sherief Meleis, Reposition the
Checking Account, BAI BANKING STRATEGIES (Jan. 1, 2010), available at
http://www.bai.org/bankingstrategies/product-management/deposit-products/repositioningthe-checking-account (stating that “perhaps 40% of the customer base” of checking
accounts are “marginal” profit producers); Bob O’Meara, Is it Time to Take a New Look at
Your Checking Strategy, THE RADDON REPORT (July 16, 2009, 1:52 PM),
http://www.theraddonreport.com/?p=1573 (stating that for any given bank the segment of
transaction accountholders who do not generate enough income to cover their operating
costs can be “more than 60 percent”).
338. Branton, supra note 337; Sidel & Fitzpatrick, supra note 337, at A1.
339. See Eric Dash & Nelson D. Schwartz, Cut Back, Banks See a Chance to Grow, N.Y.
TIMES, July 16, 2010, at B1 (“‘The rule of thumb is that it costs a bank between $150 and
$350 a year’ to maintain a checking account, said Aaron Fine, a partner at Oliver Wyman, a
financial consultancy.”); Rob Garver, Free Checking Has A Future, Mainly At Small Banks,
AM. BANKER, Mar. 15, 2011, at 4 (“‘It costs a lot of money to open and maintain a checking
account,’ said Jim Chessen, the ABA’s chief economist. ‘It costs between $150 and $200 to
open an account and the annual cost of providing a checking account is between $250 and
$300.’”). Of course, different banks will have different transaction account costs. Moebs
$ervice, a bank research firm, estimates that an average transaction account costs the largest
banks between $350 and $450 per year while it costs the smallest banks only $175 to $250
per year. Suzanne Kapner, Credit Unions Poach Clients, WALL ST. J., Nov. 7, 2011, at C1.
340. Janet Bigham Bernstal, Checking Free-For-All, ABA BANK MKTG., Mar. 1, 2005, at
14.
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A more recent white paper prepared by bank consulting firm Haberfeld
Associates puts the marginal annual cost of a transaction account at about
$30.341 This marginal cost number includes only marginal data processing,
statement expenses, the cost to issue a debit card and keep it active on the
card processing networks, and the loss of principle on charged off accounts.
When considering only marginal costs, the Haberfeld Report concludes that
less than 10% of transaction accounts do not generate sufficient income
from fees and interest to be profitable.342
This, of course, leaves open the possibility that some consumer
transaction accounts do not cover their marginal costs. However, it is not
clear that these accounts belong to upper-income consumers. The
Haberfeld Report describes one group of marginally unprofitable accounts
as “single-product customers that are active, but have no overdrafts, do not
use a debit card, do not buy checks from the bank and have less than $400
average balance.”343 It is difficult to believe that the bulk of such
customers would be wealthy consumers.344
C. Empirical Evidence of Cross-Subsidization
Although it is easy to conclude that many low-income consumers pay
a significant amount in fees associated with their transaction accounts,
there is not enough information to establish that the poor systematically pay
more than the stand-alone cost of their transaction accounts. Furthermore,
even if banks’ revenue from some subset of low-income consumers
exceeds the stand-alone cost of providing transaction account service, there
is still insufficient information to conclude that regressive crosssubsidization exists under the Faulhaber definition. Incremental costs for
transaction accounts are likely very low, meaning that most accounts will
generate enough revenue to cover the marginal cost of account service.
Using currently available data, it is impossible to conclude that the bulk of
accountholders who pay less than the marginal cost of service would be
wealthy. Neither theoretical nor empirical evidence conclusively supports
claims of regressive cross-subsidization amount transaction account
341. Jeff Platter, Haberfeld Associates, Cost Models and Checking Profitability (Jan.
2011) (unpublished white paper) (on file with author). The $30 was the average marginal
cost of Haberfeld clients “derived directly from customer data extracts [collected] . . . on a
monthly basis[.]” Id. Their sample includes “over 2 million checking households from
community banks with offices in 46 states.” Id.
342. Id.
343. Id.
344. Indeed, the FDIC study suggests that consumers living in low-income areas would
be more likely to maintain an account with an average balance below $500. FDIC,
OVERDRAFT STUDY, supra note 77, at 75.
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holders.
V.

BEYOND THE CROSS-SUBSIDIZATION ARGUMENT

The dearth of evidence of regressive cross-subsidization does not
necessarily mean that further transaction account fee regulation is not
appropriate. Indeed, Part III.B’s discussion of transaction account
regulation reveals one particularly fertile area for reform: Fee regulation
could benefit from a coherent theory. Fee regulations adopted soon after
interest rate deregulation encourage banks to charge high penalty fees. The
OCC’s regulations encourage high penalty-type fees to discourage
customers from misusing transaction account services.345 The Truth in
Savings Act encourages high overdraft and other non-maintenance fees by
allowing banks to advertise accounts without maintenance fees as “free.”346
Even state basic bank account laws allow high overdraft fees, but require
low maintenance fees.347 Some CRA agreements between banks and
community-based groups similarly allow high penalty fee, low
maintenance fee accounts.348 These laws embody an underlying philosophy
that avoidable fees are more consumer-friendly than standard maintenance
fees.
In contrast, more recent regulation is aimed at discouraging overdraft
fees. The Federal Reserve’s recent opt-in regulation allows banks to
charge debit card overdraft fees only when a consumer has authorized such
overdrafts.349 In addition, the FDIC’s Model Safe Accounts Template
recommends that banks adopt basic accounts that have a $3 monthly
maintenance charge, but do not have overdraft or insufficient funds fees.350
These regulatory efforts are premised on the underlying philosophy that
transparent maintenance fees are more consumer-friendly than avoidable
penalty fees.
This Article takes no position about the consumer-friendliness of any
particular fee structure. Rather, it offers the more modest claim that
policymakers would be more successful in influencing banks’ account
pricing decisions if they adopted a coherent regulatory philosophy.
Regulations should not simultaneously encourage and discourage banks
from charging high overdraft fees.
As policymakers consider competing regulatory philosophies, they
345.
346.
347.
348.
349.
350.

See supra notes 173-188 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 191-193 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 237-240 and accompanying text.
See supra note 267.
See supra notes 212-219 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 245-248 and accompanying text.
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should keep in mind that any adjustments to fee regulations are likely to
impact low-balance accounts more than high-balance accounts. Unless
new regulation explicitly requires regressive cross-subsidization, banks will
look to fee income from low-balance accounts to cover the cost of services
to those accounts. New fee regulation will be less likely to impact highbalance accounts because investment income earned from high-balance
accounts offsets as least part of the cost of those accounts.
CONCLUSION
Professor David Heald observed that “the topic of cross subsidy is an
excellent example of a context where language is used both imprecisely
and persuasively. Some consumers are said to be paying ‘too little for
some goods, at the expense of other consumers who are paying ‘too
much.’”351 This accurately describes assertions of regressive crosssubsidization among transaction accountholders. Although it is often
claimed that fees paid by poor consumers subsidize free accounts for the
rich, this assertion is not substantiated with currently available theoretical
or empirical evidence. Those championing additional transaction account
fee regulation should look beyond cross-subsidization to substantiate their
arguments.

351. Heald, supra note 49, at 54.

